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[Tihis course of admitting of approvers hath long been disused, and the
truth is, that more mischief hath come to good men by these kind of ap-
provements by false accusations of desperate villians, than benefit to the
public by the discovery and convicting of real offenders.'




Consider the following scenario: Watts is the organizer of a conspiracy.
Watts buys large quantities of powder cocaine from Chisholm, converts the
powder cocaine into crack cocaine, and with the help of Hines, distributes the
crack cocaine. Agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrest
Watts, Chisholm, and Hines for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. AnAssistant
United States Attorney offers Watts prosecutorial leniency in exchange for
Watts's full cooperation and his testimony against all co-conspirators. Watts,
who has an extensive criminal record and faces the possibility of life imprison-
ment, accepts the offer and leads authorities to Aaron. Aaron had introduced
Watts to Chisholm but is otherwise completely removed from the activities of
the conspiracy. FBI agents arrest Aaron for conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
Upon his arrest, authorities pressure Aaron to disclose additional infor-
mation about the conspiracy. However, because authorities arrested Aaron
last and he was the least involved in the conspiracy, Aaron cannot provide any
information that the other co-conspirators have not already revealed. Pursuant
to an agreement promising prosecutorial leniency, Watts testifies against
Aaron at trial. Watts's testimony is the only direct evidence linking Aaron to
the conspiracy. A jury convicts Aaron, and although he has no prior criminal
record, the court sentences him to life imprisonment without parole. Watts,
however, in accordance with the terms of his agreement, does not serve a
single day.
The above scenario, like the case from which it arises,3 highlights several
critical issues that currently plague the federal criminal justice system. First,
1. 2 MATiHEW HAE, PLEAs OF THE CROWN *226.
2. Frontline: Snitch (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 12, 1999) (transcript available at
<httpilwww.pbs.orgwgbh/pages/frontline/showslsnitchletc/scripthtml>) (quoting 23-year-old
Cedric Jones, who pled guilty to drug charges and then testified for prosecution against family
members, friends, and acquaintances in order to secure sentence reduction).
3. See United States v. Chisholm, 73 F.3d 304, 305-06 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing
details of conspiracy that involved four individuals and 24 kilograms of powder cocaine);
Frontline, supra note 2 (exploring several cases, including United States v. Chisholm, in which
justice system rewarded most culpable individuals with reduced sentences and punished less
culpable individuals). The facts underlying the scenario arise from the story of 23-year-old
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the scenario is a powerful reminder of the severity of mandatory minimum
sentences.4 Second, the scenario suggests that under the federal drug conspir-
acy law, courts have license to judge people solely by the company they keep.'
Clarence Aaron, a former student-athlete at Southern University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. See
Frontline, supra note 2 (discussing Aaron's background). Aaron's cousin, Marion Watts, was
a drug dealer in MobileAlabama. Id. In 1992, Watts lost his cocaine source and his subsequent
search for a new source led to Aaron's involvement in the conspiracy. Chisholm, 73 F.3d at 305.
Aaron had endeavored to stay clear of drugs, but when Watts called and asked Aaron to intro-
duce him to someone in Baton Rouge who might supply cocaine, Aaron decided to help.
Frontline, supra note 2. Aaron drove Watts and Robert Hines, one of Watts's associates, from
Mobile to Baton Rouge and back in order to introduce them to Elwyn Chisholm. Id. Chisholm,
through a source in Houston, provided a significant amount of powder cocaine to Watts, who
converted itto crack cocaine and distributed it. See Chisholm, 73 F.3d at 305-06 (describing first
of two drug transactions that involved total of 24 kilograms of powder cocaine). Watts, who was
facing the possibility of a life sentence because of his extensive criminal record, used Aaron as
a bargaining chip in the negotiation of his plea agreement Frontline, supra note 2. In exchange
for a plea agreement that promised prosecutorial leniency, Watts testified against Aaron at trial.
See Chisholm, 73 F.3d at 305 (discussing Watts's guilty plea on lesser charge and Watts's
testimony against Aaron at trial). Watts's testimony was the only direct evidence linking Aaron
to the conspiracy. SeeFrontline, supra note 2 (discussing government's case). The government
did not introduce any cocaine into evidence, nor did it produce any scientific evidence that
incriminated Aaron. See id. (stating that accomplice testimony formed basis for entire case). A
jury convicted Aaron, and although he had no prior criminal record, the court sentenced him to
life imprisonment. Chisholm, 73 F.3d at 306. Watts, however, in accordance with the terms of
his plea agreement, did not serve a single day. See Frontline, supra note 2 (discussing fate of
other co-conspirators).
4. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 199, 221 (1993) (stating that "[s]entences that seemed fair when judged in the abstract
from Washington often seem too harsh as applied in context to a particular case"); Karen Lutien,
Student Article, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETmIcs & PUB. POL'Y 389, 465 (1996) (arguing that mandatory minimum sentencing is
conceptually flawed because it does not allow court to assess culpability within context of both
offense and offender); John Cloud, A Get-Tough Policy That Failed, TIE, Feb. 1, 1999, at 49
(discussing severity of mandatory minimum sentences). Cloud stated that "[m]ost mandatory
sentences were designed as weapons in the drug war, with an awful consequence: we now live
in a country where it's common to get a longer sentence for selling a neighbor a joint than for,
say, sexually abusing her." Id. But see Michael M. Baylson, Mandatory Minimum Sentences:
A FederalProsecutor's Viewpoint, 40 FED. B. NEWS &J. 167,167 (1993) (justifying mandatory
minimum sentences as legitimate limitations upon judicial discretion).
5. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10,15 (1994) (stating that in order to establish
that defendant violated 21 U.S.C. § 846, federal drug conspiracy statute, "the Government need
not prove the commission of any overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy"). One scholar has
suggested that the fundamental effect of Shabani is to encourage the government to attempt to
convict defendants in drug conspiracy cases solely through accomplice testimony, which is
simply not reliable enough to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant conspired to
violate federal drug laws. See Kevin Jon Heller, Whatever Happened to Proof Beyond a
ReasonableDoubt?: OfDrugConpiracies OvertActs and United States v. Shabani, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 111,142 (1996) ("Unless overruled, Shabani will ensure ihat drug conspiracy prosecu-
tions convict both the guilty and the innocent alike.").
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Finally, it illustrates the government's increased dependence upon accomplice
testimony' and the gross inequity that can result from this dependence! Recent
criticism ofthis inequity has revitalized the classic debate aboutthe admissibil-
ity of accomplice testimony offered in exchange for prosecutorial leniency.'
In Crawford v. United States9 the Supreme Court stated that courts
should view accomplice testimony with suspicion and that juries should not
evaluate accomplice testimony according to the same rules that govern more
credible witnesses.1" Yet, in the ninety years since Crawford, not only has the
6. See Mark Curriden, SecretThreattoJutice, NAT'LL.J.,Feb. 20,1995, atAl (discuss-
ing criminal justice system's addiction to informants and corresponding potential for abuse);
Paul Craig Roberts, Skewed Scales ofJustice, WASH. TME.S, Jan. 15, 1999, at A16 (discussing
marked increase in criminal cases built around accomplice testimony); Mark Rollenhagen, PLAI
DEAI.ER (Cleveland), Jan. 3, 1999, at lB (discussing recent increase in prosecutorial use of
accomplice testimony). As Patrick A. Tuite and Ronald D. Menaker observed:
It is becoming increasingly prevalent in both the state and federal systems for
prosecutors to cut deals with those either charged with or suspected of committing
crimes with the defendant The prosecutor's objective in such a case is clear: to
secure the testimony at trial of that person against the defendant
PatrickA. Tuite & Ronald D. Menaker, CourtSlams Testimony-for-Leniency Deals, CHL DAILY
L. BulL., July 15, 1998, at 6. Accomplices are those individuals whom the government has or
could have indicted for the same crime with which it has charged the defendant See Lester B.
Orfield, Corroboration ofAccomplice Testimony in Federal Criminal Cases, 9 Vi.L L. REV.
15, 25 (1962) (stating that accomplice is one who is liable for identical statutory offense gov-
ernment has charged against defendant).
7. See HarveyA. Silverglate, Use ofInformersHurtsAccuseds'Rights, NAT'LL.J., Jan.
30, 1995, at A21 (arguing that routine use of accomplice testimony offered pursuant to plea
agreements is fundamentally unfair and may violate due process); Frontline, supra note 2
(investigating how fundamental shift in federal antidrug laws has bred culture that, in many
cases, rewards guiltiest individuals while punishing less guilty individuals).
8. See Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 7-8 (1992) (discussing "ancient roots" of modem practice of procuring accomplice testi-
mony with leniency); Yvette A. Beeman, Note, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea
Agreements, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 800, 800-01 (1987) (describing long history of offering
prosecutorial leniency in return for accomplice testimony); Case Note, Accomplice Testimony
Under ConditionalPromise oflmmunity, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 138, 139.40 (1952) [hereinafter
Case Note, Conditional Promise] (detailing history of obtaining accomplice testimony through
prosecutorial inducements); Neil B. Eisenstadt, Note, Let's Make a Deal: A Look at United
States v. Dailey andProsecutor-WitnessCooperationAgreements, 67 B.U. L. REV. 749,761-62
(1987) (discussing historical origins of accomplice witness agreements).
9. 212 U.S. 183 (1909).
10. See Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 204 (1909) (asserting that accomplice
testimony "ought to be received with suspicion, and with the very greatest care and caution, and
ought not to be passed upon by the jury under the same rules governing other and apparently
credible witnesses"). In Crawford, the Supreme Court considered the appeal of a defendant
convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States. Id. at 188-92. According to the Crawford
Court, the trial court improperly excluded evidence that tended to prove the defendant's
innocence. Id. at 205. First, the trial court erred by not sustaining defendant's challenge to a
TOWARD A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
federal criminal justice system failed to detect and curtail accomplice
perjury, but it also has adopted a statutory scheme wherein the government,
through its prosecutors, seemingly solicits accomplice perjury by offering
inducements for testimony. 2 Recently, many scholars and commentators have
criticized federal courts for their reluctance to exclude, to limit, or even to
scrutinize accomplice testimony offered in exchange for prosecutorial le-
niency. 3 Scholars have argued that admission of accomplice testimony
juror who was a government employee. Id. at 197. Second, the trial court erred by limiting the
scope of defendant's testimony. Id. at 202. Although the Court refused to assign error to the
admission of an accomplice's testimony, it cautioned that juries should not consider such testi-
mony as equal to that of an ordinary witness. Id. at 204. After finding that the questionable
accomplice testimony was the only evidence tending to establish the defendant's guilt, the Court
concluded that the government had failed to rebut the presumption of harm that arises from the
erroneous exclusion of material evidence. Id. Consequently, the Crawford Court reversed the
defendant's conviction. Id. at 208.
Since Crawford, the Supreme Court consistently has indicated its distrust of accomplice
testimony. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968) ("Not only are the [accom-
plice's] incriminations devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably sus-
pect.. . ."); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952) (stating that use of accomplice
witnesses may raise "serious questions of credibility"); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470, 495 (1917) (stating preference that courts "caution juries against too much reliance upon
testimony of accomplices and... require corroborating testimony before giving credence to
such evidence").
11. See Lisa C. Harris, Note, Periry Defeats Justice, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1755, 1777
(1996) ("[Flew offenders of this serious crime are ever punished and perjury in the courtrooms
continues to skyrocket seemingly out of control."); Christine 3. Saverda, Note, Accomplices in
Federal Court: A Casefor Increased Evidentiary Standards, 100 YALE L.J. 785, 788 (1990)
(discussing pervasiveness of perjury in criminal justice system).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994) (authorizing reduction of sentences for "substantial
assistance"); 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1994) (mandating that sentencing guidelines allow sentence
reductions to take into account defendant's "substantial assistance"); infra notes 286-95 and
accompanying text (discussing statutory scheme). Federal courts repeatedly have recognized
that the chances of perjury increase when an accomplice testifies in exchange for consideration.
See, e.g., Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447, 451 (4th Cir. 1976) (discussing accomplice's
incentive to please promisor); McMl'len v. United States, 386 F.2d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 1967)
(stating that in plea negotiations, accomplices are subject to both carrot and stick); United States
v. Baresh, 595 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (S.D. Tex 1984) (stating that state attorneys created situa-
tion that invited perjury from accomplice).
13. See Hughes, supra note 8, at 65 (urging courts to prevent dangers that accomplice plea
agreements pose); Beeman, supra note 8, at 826 (arguing that failure of courts to exclude
accomplice testimony results in erosion of truth-seeking function of criminal justice system);
Eisenstadt, supra note 8, at 781-72 (criticizing reluctance of courts to rein in prosecutors by
limiting use of accomplice plea agreements); Saverda, supra note 11, at 787-88 (discussing
reluctance of courts to scrutinize uncorroborated accomplice testimony); Case Note, Conditional
Promise, supra note 8, at 140-41 (stating that lack of judicial scrutiny increases burden on
defense counsel to explore plea agreement and to discredit accomplice witness); Silverglate,
supra note 7 (criticizing inactivity of federal courts in area of accomplice plea agreements); inf-a
Part I (discussing scholarship dealing with exclusion or limitation of accomplice testimony).
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offered in exchange for prosecutorial leniency violates the defendant's consti-
tutional due process rights. 4 These scholars also have argued that courts
should exclude accomplice testimony pursuant to their supervisory powers to
reject unreliable evidence'5 or that courts should limit the effectiveness of the
testimony by requiring corroborating evidence of testimony offered in ex-
change for prosecutorial leniency. 6
In United States v. Singleton (Singleton 1)," the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit offered yet another basis for excluding or
limiting the use of testimony arising from accomplice plea agreements. 8 A
unanimous panel of the court concluded that offering prosecutorial leniency
in exchange for testimony violated the antigratuity provision of the federal
witness bribery statute'9 as well as a Kansas rule of professional conduct."0
14. See Hughes, supra note 8, at 35 (stating that due process considerations should prevent
prosecutors from bargaining for specific testimony); Beeman, supra note 8, at 826 (concluding
that admission of unreliable accomplice testimony violates due process); Eisenstadt, supra note
8, at 781-82 (suggesting that accomplice testimony offered pursuant to certain plea agreements
is utterly at odds with due process); Silverglate, supra note 7 (arguing that use of accomplice
testimony offered pursuant to plea agreements is fundamentally unfair and may violate due
process); infra Part IRA (discussing due process scholarship).
15. See Beeman, supra note 8, at 823 (suggesting that courts should exclude accomplice
testimony pursuant to their supervisory powers in order to prevent impairment of defendant's
right to fair trial); Eisenstadt, supra note 8, at 779 (arguing that courts could rely on their super-
visory powers to exclude accomplice witnesses' testimony); infra Part IIl.B (discussing supervi-
sory power scholarship).
16. See Saverda, supra note 11, at 804 (concluding that corroboration requirement for
accomplice testimony is both desirable and viable method of reform in federal courts).
17. 144 F.3d 1343(1Oth Cir.), vacatedandreh'ggranted, 144 F.3d 1343,1361 (10th Cir.
1998), reh'g en bane, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
18. United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1352 (10th Cir.) [hereinafter Singleton I]
(concluding that government's promise of leniency in exchange for testimony violated federal
witness bribery statute), vacated and reh'g granted, 144 F.3d 1343, 1361 (10th Cir. 1998),
reh'g en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999). In Singleton I, the court considered whether
offering prosecutorial leniency in exchange for testimony violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(cX2), the
federal witness bribery statute. Id. at 1344. According to the Singleton I court, a limited canon
of construction provides that statutes do not apply to the government unless the text expressly
includes the government. Id. at 1345. Even so, the Singleton I court determined that the statute
did not implicate the limited canon of construction for two reasons. Id. at 1345-48. First,
application of § 201(cX2) would not deprive the government of a recognized prerogative. Id.
at 1346. Second, application of § 201(cX2) to the government would not work an obvious
absurdity. Id. at 1347-48. Therefore, the Singleton I court concluded that § 201(cX2) applies
to federal prosecutors. Id. at 1348. The Singleton I court also concluded that the promises of
leniency made to the accomplice witness fell within the statutory term "anything of value." Id.
at 1351. Consequently, the court held that offering prosecutorial leniency in exchange for
testimony violated § 201(cX2). Id. at 1352.
19. Id.; see infra Part IVA (discussing reasoning of Singleton 1).
20. Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1359; see infra Part IVA (discussing reasoning of Single-
ton 1).
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The Singleton I court reasoned that the purpose of the federal bribery statute
is to preserve the reliability of testimonial evidence by eradicating a signifi-
cant incentive to provide false testimony."1 The court therefore concluded that
purchasing factual testimony, whether with money or with leniency, violates
the federal bribery statute .2 The Tenth Circuit vacated Singleton 1 3 and later
reached a contrary conclusion sitting en banc.24 Nevertheless, Singleton Itrig-
gered an unprecedented national examination of accomplice testimony' and
offered a new analytical framework for analyzing accomplice testimony.26
This Note considers whether accomplice testimony offered in exchange
for prosecutorial leniency is so unreliable that federal courts should exclude
the testimony from evidence or otherwise limit its admissibility. Part II
recounts the history of accomplice cooperation agreements and the recent
developments in this area.27 Part I surveys the current scholarship concern-
ing accomplice cooperation agreements and the testimony arising out of these
agreements. 28 Part IV analyzes Singleton I and the Tenth Circuit's en banc
decision. 9 Part IV also examines the decisions of other federal courts that
faced challenges to accomplice testimony in the wake of Singleton L" Part V
discusses how federal courts, in their haste to reject the holding of Singleton I,
21. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1346 ("The anti-gratuity provision of § 201(cX2) indi-
cates Congress's belief that justice is undermined by giving, offering, or promising anything of
value for testimony.").
22. See id. at 1347 ("The judicial process is tainted and justice cheapened when factual
testimony is purchased, whether with leniency or money.").
23. See id. at 1361 (vacating panel's opinion).
24. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999) (en bane)
[hereinafter Singleton HI] (finding that § 201(cX2) does not prohibit offering prosecutorial
leniency in exchange for testimony).
25. See William Glaberson, Legal World Shaken by Ruling Barring Witness Leniency,
DENV. POST, Dec. 3, 1998, at A33 ("The decision, which some lawyers say may be the first
successful challenge under the federal bribery law to the practice of offering witnesses leniency,
a centerpiece of the legal system since Colonial times, has triggered an unprecedented national
examination in the courts, in Congress and among legal scholars.").
26. Although several scholars had asserted that offering prosecutorial leniency in ex-
change for testimony ran afoul of bribery statutes, no one had taken the argument seriously until
Singleton L See United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 987 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Until
Singleton, no other court in the thirty-six year history of section 201(cX2) had applied its pro-
hibition to a prosecutorial grant of leniency in exchange for truthful testimony."); Stuart Taylor
Jr., Sauce for the Goose, N.Y. L.J., July 13, 1998, at 2 (stating that before Singleton I, no one
had taken bribery argument seriously).
27. See infra Part H (explaining background of accomplice cooperation agreements).
28. See infra Part III (considering accomplice cooperation agreements and corresponding
scholarship).
29. See infra Part IVA-B (analyzing Singleton land Singleton 1l).
30. See infra Part IV.C (analyzing decisions of various federal courts addressing accom-
plice testimony).
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failed to address the inherent dangers of accomplice testimony offered in
exchange for prosecutorial leniency.3" Finally, Part VI concludes that the
dangers of accomplice testimony offered in exchange for prosecutorial leni-
ency, in some circumstances, warrant exclusion of the testimony under Rule
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence."
ff. Overview ofAccomplice Cooperation Agreements
A. Historical Practice
Early common law recognized approvement, a procedure whereby a
person arraigned for a felony could accuse another of the same crime.33
Authorities usually pardoned the accuser upon the accused's conviction or
convicted the accuser upon the accused's acquittal.' Approvement later fell
into disuse because conditioning the accuser's pardon upon the conviction of
the accused was so conducive to perjury that it outweighed its value as an
incentive to cooperate. 5 Eventually, the practice of 'turning king's evidence"
evolved, 6 whereby an accomplice became eligible for a pardon simply by
testifying fully and fairly, independent of a resulting conviction.37 The prac-
tice initially faced challenge in the treason trials of the seventeenth century,
when the English courts held that accomplice testimony given in exchange for
31. See infra Part V (describing federal courts' failure to address inherent dangers of
accomplice testimony that arises out of plea agreements).
32. See inffra Part VI (suggesting exclusion under Rule 403 as solution to dangers of
accomplice testimony offered in exchange for prosecutorial leniency).
33. 2 HALE, supra note 1, at *226; see The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 599 (1878)
(discussing ancient practice of approvement (citing 4 WniLIAM BLACKsTONE, COMMENTARIES
*330)).
34. See 2 HALE, supra note 1, at *226 (explaining practice of approvement).
35. See id. ("[T]his course of admitting of approvers hath long been disused, and the truth
is, that more mischief hath come to good men by these kind of approvements by false accusa-
tions of desperate villians, than benefit to the public by the discovery and convicting of real
offenders. ... "); Case Note, Conditional Promise, supra note 8, at 139 (stating that practice of
approvement fell into disuse around 1500 because conditioning accomplice's pardon upon
conviction of defendant was thought to be so conducive to perjury as to outweigh its value as
incentive to "squealing").
36. In the United States, the phrase "turning king's evidence" came to be known as
"turning State's evidence." See Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 203 (1909) ("[A]
confessed accomplice, was thus produced by the Government as a witness for the purpose of
proving its case against defendant, the witness having, as it would appear, in popular language,
turned 'State's evidence'....").
37. See Case Note, Conditional Promise, supra note 8, at 139 (stating that practice of
turning king's evidence "differs from approvement in that the accomplice witness is granted a
right to pardon conditioned not upon the defendant's conviction but upon the accomplice's
testifying fully and fairly").
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a pardon was competent, despite its diminished credibility. 8 This view pre-
vailed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and was incorporated into the
standard treatises on criminal law, evidence, and procedure. 9 Relying on
these treatises with only a cursory analysis of the underlying cases, American
courts unanimously have followed the rule of the English treason trials,
expanding it to cover promises of pardon as well as bargains for leniency and
immunity from prosecution.40
B. Modern Practice
Today, prosecutors routinely offer agreements for immunity or leniency
to accomplices in exchange for testimony.41 Prosecutors enjoy wide latitude
in the type of promises they can make, presumably in order to overcome the
obstacles that otherwise would prevent evidence from reaching the fact
finder.42 Prosecutors may promise immunity from prosecution,43 dropped or
38. See id. (stating that "practice of turning king's evidence was apparently first chal-
lenged in treason trials of seventeenth century, in which accomplice testimony given under
promise of pardon was held to be competent though of diminished credibility").
39. See, e.g., 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 379 (1842) (discussing competency of
accomplice witnesses); 2 WLLAM HAWKINS, PLEAs OF TE CROWN432 (2d ed. 1724) (same);
FRANCIS WHARTON, CRIMINALEVIMENCE § 439 (9th ed. 1884) (same). These texts had a signif-
icant influence on the development of law in the United States. See Eisenstadt, supra note 8,
at 762-63 (suggesting that such treatises shaped law in United States).
40. .See Case Note, ConditionalPromise, supra note 8, at 139-40 ("Relying on these texts
with but superficial examination of the cases, American decisions have unanimously followed
the rule of the English treason trials, adapting it to cover not only promises of pardon but also
bargains for leniency and immunity from prosecution.").
41. See Hughes, supra note 8, at 2 (stating that cooperation agreements have acquired
considerable importance at both federal and state level). Approximately 90% of all criminal
defendants plead guilty. JAMES E. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS § 1.2 (2d ed.
1983); cf BUREAUOFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOKOFCRnIvNAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1998, at 402 tbl. 5.16 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1999)
(stating that 79.3% of criminal defendants brought before United States district courts in fiscal
year 1996 pled guilty). An uncertain but substantial percentage of these defendants agree to
testify against their co-defendants or co-conspirators in return for prosecutorial leniency. BOND,
supra, § 1.8.
42. See Hughes, supra note 8, at 8 (discussing prosecutors' unrestricted discretion to
purchase testimony through agreements); Note, A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Promises of
Favorable Treatment Made to Witnessesfor the Prosecuion, 94 HARv. L. REV. 887, 889 (1981)
[hereinafter Note, Duty to Disclose] ("[P]rosecutors are granted the power to make these prom-
ises in order to remove obstacles that would otherwise prevent crucial evidence from reaching
the trier of fact.").
43. See, e.g., Gigio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,152 n.2 (197,2) (discussing agreement
in which prosecutor agreed not to indict accomplice); United States v. Hoover, 727 F.2d 387,
390 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that decision not to prosecute similarly situated persons lies within
discretion of executive branch); United States v. Mayo, 705 F.2d 62,77 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating
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reduced charges,"4 monetary payments,45 or a commitment to recommend
probation or a lenient sentence." In contrast, defendants may not offer any
inducements to a witness in order to obtain favorable testimony.' The only
tool at defendants' disposal is the Sixth Amendment's compulsory process
doctrine,4" which grants defendants the right to subpoena witnesses to testify
on their behalf.49 Society's assumption that different motivations guide the
prosecutor and the defendant has served as the traditional justification for this
disparity in power.5"
that prosecutor had discretion not to bring perjury charge against government witness); see also
Hughes, supra note 8, at 4-7 (discussing nature and function of informal immunity grants). In
addition to offering informal promises not to prosecute, federal prosecutors can offer "use" im-
munity under the Witness Immunity Act of 1970. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1994) (autho-
rizing offers of use immunity). Use immunity allows a prosecutor to compel the testimony of
a witness over a Fifth Amendment claim, but prohibits the use of the compelled testimony to
develop or to try a case against the witness. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1994). Formerly, federal
prosecutors offered transactional immunity, in which the government afforded the witness
complete immunity from prosecution for any transaction mentioned in the compelled testimony.
See Narcotic Control Act of 1956, ch. 629, sec. 201, § 1406, 70 Stat 574 (repealed 1970). With
the advent of use immunity, requests for immunity have surged. See Saverda, supra note 11,
at 789 (stating that prosecutors immunized more witnesses under Witness Immunity Act of 1970
during first 10 months of its existence than they had immunized during preceding 50 years of
transactional immunity).
44. See United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 886-87 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing dismis-
sal of narcotics charges in exchange for testimony); Blankenship v. Estelle, 545 F.2d 510, 512
(5th Cir. 1977) (discussing dismissal of armed robbery and attempted murder charges in
exchange for testimony).
45. See United States v. Jackson, 579 F.2d 553, 555 (10th Cir. 1978) (discussing $300
payment to unindicted accomplice in exchange for testimony); Sanders v. United States, 541
F.2d 190, 192 (8th Cir. 1976) (detailing repeated payments to informant-witness).
46. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 267-68 & n.3 (1959) (stating that prosecutor
promised reduction of 199-year sentence in exchange for testimony); Campbell v. Reed, 594
F.2d 4, 6 (4th Cir. 1979) (discussing details of prosecutor's agreement to drop all remaining
charges against accomplice and to file recommendation for lenient sentencing in exchange for
accomplice's testimony).
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1994) (prohibiting bribery of witnesses); see also Note,
Duty to Disclose, supra note 42, at 889 ("[A] defendant may not offer a witness money or favors
in exchange for his testimony or threaten him with dire consequences if his testimony is not
'cooperative.'").
48. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) ("The [defendant's] right to offer
the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary is... a fundamental
element of due process of law.").
49. See id. at 23 (stating that Texas denied petitioner's right to compulsory process
"because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was
physically and mentally capable of testifying"). Compulsory process does not, however, assure
the defendant that the witness will provide favorable testimony once the witness is in court.
50. See Note, Duty to Disclose, supra note 42, at 889-90 (stating that disparity in roles
and duties between prosecutor and defendant justifies disparity in power).
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When life or liberty is at stake, human nature leads a defendant to take
almost any step to avoid conviction.51 For this reason, granting defendants the
power to encourage others to testify in their favor would invite widespread
abuse.52 The prosecutor, on the other hand, has not only a duty to seek a
conviction, but also an overriding duty to ensure that 'justice shall be done. '53
This duty creates an underlying assumption that, because prosecutors must
temper their zeal to convict, they will not abuse the power to make promises
of favorable treatment.54 Because a similar duty to ensure justice does not
constrain defendants, the justice system deprives them of this power.55
The separation of powers doctrine generally prevents judicial interfer-
ence with the prosecutor's broad discretion in initiating and conducting crim-
inal prosecutions.56 As early as 1878, federal courts acknowledged that tradi-
tional accomplice plea agreements57 are within the boundaries ofprosecutorial
discretion. 8 Traditional accomplice plea agreements typically require the
witness to promise to testify "fully and fhirly" or "truthfully.159 If the accom-
51. See id. (discussing assumption that defendants will use any means to avoid convic-
tion).
52. See id. (stating that defendants would abuse power to coerce favorable testimony).
53. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976) ("[T]hough the attorney for
the sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness and vigor, he must always be faithful
to his client's overriding interest that 'justice shall be done.' He is the 'servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."' (citing Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935))).
54. See Note, Duty to Disclose, supra note 42, at 890 ("Because of this 'higher' duty it is
assumed that the prosecutor will not abuse the power to make promises of favorable treatment.").
55. See id. ("The defendant is denied this power because he is not, and realistically could
not be, subject to a similar duty."); see also United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 774-75 (2d.
Cir. 1980) ("[I]n the context of criminal investigation and criminal trials, where accuser and
accused have inherently different roles, with entirely different powers and rights, equalization
is not a sound principle on which to extend any particular procedural device.").
56. See United States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229, 1235 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that
reluctance of courts to review prosecutorial decisions is grounded in separation of powers).
57. See The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 599-606 (1878) (discussing practice of offering
pardon to accomplices who testify fully and fairly to their own and their associates' actions in
case).
58. See id. at 603 ("[lt is regarded as the province of the public prosecutor and not of the
court to determine whether or not an accomplice, who is willing to criminate himself and his
associates in guilt, shall be called and examined for the State."); see also United States v.
Librach, 536 F.2d 1228, 1230 (8th Cir. 1976) ("An agreement not to prosecute an accomplice
who is cooperating in the conviction of others is recognized as a proper exercise of [prosecuto-
rial] authority." (citing ABA STANDARDs FOR CRIMINAL JUsncE § 3.9(bXvii) (1971))).
59. See Note, Accomplice Testimony and Credibility: "Vouching" and Prosecutorial
Abuse ofAgreements to Testfy Truthfully, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1169,1170 (1981) ("When testi-
mony is the object of the agreement, the individual usually must promise to testify 'fully and
fairly' or 'truthfully."').
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plice witness does not testify fully and truthfully, the prosecutor may refuse
the leniency promised in the bargain.'
In recent years, prosecutors have tested the limits of their discretion by
experimenting with the simple quid pro quo format of traditional accomplice
plea agreements." Some prosecutors have begun to offer accomplice wit-
nesses contingent plea agreements in exchange for their testimony.62 In
contingent plea agreements, the immunity or leniency is contingent upon
success in obtaining further indictments or a conviction, or upon the value to
the prosecution ofthe testimony or information provided.63 A number of state
courts have censured contingent plea agreements, overturning the resulting
convictions on both due process and policy grounds.' Federal courts, how-
ever, consistently have rejected challenges to both traditional and contingent
accomplice plea agreements.65
I. The Case for Exclusion or Limitation
The Supreme Court has determined that the testimony of accomplices
who receive lenient treatment is not per se unreliable."" Federal courts have
60. See id. ("Th[e] truthfulness agreement becomes part of the plea bargaining agreement,
and if the witness does not testify truthfully he or she may lose the benefits ofthe plea bargain.").
61. See Beeman, supra note 8, at 800 ("In recent years, some prosecutors have further
conditioned the accomplice's reduction in sentence upon the defendant's indictment or convic-
tion or the prosecutor's satisfaction with the accomplice's testimony.").
62. See id. at 809 (discussing contingent plea agreements).
63. See id. (explaining operation of contingent plea agreements).
64. See, e.g., People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App. 3d 438,455 (1974) ("[A] defendant is denied
a fair trial if the prosecution's case depends substantially upon accomplice testimony and the
accomplice witness is placed, either by the prosecution or the court, under a strong compulsion
to testify in a particular fashion."); People v. Green, 228 P.2d 867, 871-72 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1951) (reversing conviction that rested solely upon testimony of accomplice when government
had conditioned accomplice's promise of immunity upon defendant's conviction); Franklin v.
State, 577 P.2d 860, 862 (Nev. 1978) ("[I]f the circumstances of the plea bargain would reason-
ably cause the alleged accomplice to believe he must testify in a particular fashion, then a less
explicit arrangement [than that in Medina] also violates defendant's due process rights.").
65. See United States v. Wilson, 904 F.2d 656, 657 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (finding that contin-
gent agreement did not violate defendant's due process rights); United States v. Spector, 793
F.2d 932, 936-37 (8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting defendant's due process argument); United States
v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361, 1374 (8th Cir. 1986) (sanctioning contingent agreement); United
States v. Fallon, 776 F.2d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that contingent plea agreement did
not violate due process); United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192,196 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding that
contingent plea agreement did not violate due process); United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d
1527, 1533 (8th Cir. 1984) (en bane, 4-4 decision) (affirming district court's judgment that
contingent plea agreement did not violate due process); infra Part ]IlA (discussing due process
line of cases). But see United States v. Baresh, 595 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (S.D. Tex. 1984)
(concluding that contingent plea agreement violated due process).
66. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,495 (1917) ("[T]here is no absolute rule
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allowed convictions based on uncorroborated testimony of accomplices to
stand when the testimony was not "incredible or unsubstantial on its face."'
Indeed, courts have upheld convictions based on accomplice testimony even
when the accomplice is an admitted pejurer." The reluctance of federal
courts to impose any limits on prosecutorial use of accomplice plea agree-
ments has limited the debate concerning accomplice testimony to the narrow
discussion of contingent plea agreements.
Until Singleton I, debate concerning accomplice testimony focused on
testimony arising out of contingent plea agreements.6 9 Two interrelated factors
caused most scholars to reserve their criticism for contingent plea agreements.
First, federal courts' repeated pronouncement that traditional accomplice plea
agreements are constitutionally unobjectionable limited the scope of scholars'
reliance on due process arguments. ° Second, the reluctance of federal courts
to impose any limits on prosecutorial use of accomplice plea agreements
forced scholars to illustrate the dangers of unreliability with contingent plea
agreements, which subject accomplices to more coercive pressure than tradi-
tional plea agreements do."1
Although scholars appropriately identified contingent plea agreements
as the "worst case scenarios" in which the danger of perjury is so severe that
courts should exclude the testimony, Singleton Imoved the debate beyond the
narrow discussion of contingent plea agreements. 2 Now, courts and scholars
of law preventing convictions on the testimony of accomplices .... ."). But see infra note 75 and
accompanying text (explaining that Supreme Court has found all accomplice testimony suspect).
67. See Haakinson v. United States, 238 F.2d 775,779 (8th Cir. 1956) ("[T]he testimony
of an accomplice, though uncorroborated, can legally constitute a sufficient basis for a convic-
tion, if it is not otherwise incredible or unsubstantial on its face.").
68. See United States v. Miceli, 446 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1971) (stating that testimony
of admitted perjurer, who had long history of criminal convictions and made advantageous deal
with government, was not "incredible or unsubstantial on its face").
69. See Hughes, supra note 8, at 35-36 (arguing that contingency requirements irretriev-
ably taint testimony); Beeman, supra note 8, at 826 (concluding that courts must prohibit con-
tingent agreements between accomplices and prosecutors); Eisenstadt, supra note 8, at 767
(suggesting that pressures in contingency agreement make witness's proposed testimony so
inherently tainted and unreliable as to render jury incapable of performing its truth-seeking
function); see also Samuel A. Perroni & Mona J. McNutt, Criminal Contingency Fee Agree-
ments: ffowFairAre They?, 16 U.ARx. Lr RocKL.J. 211,230-31 (1994) (concluding that
courts must place limits on use of contingency fee agreements).
70. See supra note 58 (quoting The Whiskey Cases and United States v. Librach).
71. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (summarizing scholars' contention that
contingent plea agreements encourage perjury by explicitly indicating nature of testimony that
government expects).
72. See Singleton I, 144 F.3d 1343, 1344 (10th Cir.) (discussing specific promises that
government made, none of which were contingent upon defendant's conviction), vacated and
reh 'g granted, 144 F.3d 1343, 1361 (10th Cir. 1998), reh 'g en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.
1999).
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must examine the broader assertion that accomplice plea agreements in any
form tend to produce dangerously unreliable testimony.' Existing scholarship
dealing with contingent plea agreements, however, is still relevant in today's
broader debate because the coercive pressure that a contingent plea agreement
produces differs only slightly from that which a traditional plea agreement
produces.74
The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that all accomplice testi-
mony is inherently suspect." This recognition reflects the fact that accom-
plices have a natural tendency to lie in order to minimize their own culpa-
bility."6 A promise of leniency in exchange for testimony encourages that
natural inclination." Scholars have argued that an agreement requiring the
procurement of an indictment or a conviction strongly suggests to the accom-
plice witness the nature of the testimony that the government expects.7" These
scholars have contended that such a requirement directs an unacceptable
amount of coercive power at an accomplice witness, and therefore, courts
should exclude the resultant testimony. Indeed, judicial censure of promises
73. One of the primary reasons that Singleton I sparked so much controversy is that it
threatened prosecutors' ability to enter into any agreement, contingent or otherwise, in which
the government offered something of value in exchange for testimony. See Sarah Huntley,
Court to Rule if Aiding Informants Is Illegal, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 28, 1998, at Al ("The
[Singleton] issue is one that strikes at the heart of thousands of federal prosecutions."); David
E. Rovella, 10th Circuit Plea DealsAren'tBribery, NAT'LL.J., Jan. 25,1999, atA8 ("Federal
prosecutors breathed a collective sigh of relief Jan. 8 when the [Tenth Circuit] helped settle a
two-year debate over whether prosecutor plea deals are in fact bribes.").
74. See infra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (discussing similarity between pressure
that contingent plea agreements and traditional plea agreements produce).
75. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968) ("Not only are the [accom-
plice's] incriminations devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably sus-
pect .... '); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952) (stating that use of accomplice
witnesses "may raise serious questions of credibility"); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470, 495 (1917) (stating preference that courts "caution juries against too much reliance upon
testimony of accomplices and... require corroborating testimony before giving credence to
such evidence").
76. See Hughes, supra note 8, at 35 (stating that accomplices have tendency to lie in order
to deemphasize their role in criminal act); Beeman, supra note 8, at 820-21 (suggesting that
witnesses may lie to downplay their own culpability).
77. See Hughes, supra note 8, at 35 (stating that promises of leniency increase accompli-
ces' tendency to lie); Beeman, supra note 8, at 820 (discussing likelihood that bargain will
heavily influence content of testimony).
78. See Hughes, supra note 8, at 35 ("The witness is being crudely told that he will get
no reward unless his testimony is of a certain nature."); Beeman, supra note 8, at 802 (suggest-
ing that contingent plea agreements provide "virtually irresistible temptation" for witness to say
whatever prosecutor desires).
79. See Hughes, supra note 8, at 35 ("This [requirement] imposes a very high degree of
pressure and influence and, thus, should render the testimony tainted."); Beeman, supra note
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of leniency conditioned upon indictment or conviction of the defendant arises
from the belief that these promises exert so great a pressure upon a witness to
perjure himself that courts cannot uphold a conviction based onthe testimony.80
Only a slight difference, however, separates this pressure from that
exerted upon a witness by a traditional plea agreement that promises immunity
or leniency in exchange for testifying fully and fairly. 1 In either case, an
accomplice must persuade the prosecutor that the accomplice's testimony at
least will tend to incriminate the defendant before the prosecutor will consider
an offer of immunity or leniency." Moreover, an accomplice has a significant
incentive to tailor his testimony to the prosecutor's case in order to secure the
benefits of either a contingent or a traditional plea agreement.8 3 Therefore,
accomplice testimony offered pursuant to any prosecutorial agreement is open
to suspicion.84
A. Due Process
Although the Supreme Court has upheld traditional accomplice plea
agreements as constitutional, the exact limitations upon prosecutorial discre-
tion remain unclear.8" In light of this broad discretion, many scholars have
attacked the use of contingent plea agreements as a violation of the defen-
dant's rightto due process.86 The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
8, at 821 ("[A]greements contingent upon the prosecution's satisfaction or the outcome of the
case pressure witnesses in an unpredictable manner.").
80. See Beeman, supra note 8, at 802 ("Courts prohibit [contingent] agreements because
they provide a virtually irresistible temptation for the witness to say whatever will satisfy the
prosecution."); Case Note, Conditional Promise, supra note 8, at 140 (discussing judicial
censure of contingent agreements).
81. See Case Note, ConditionalPromise, supra note 8, at 140 ("[B]ut a slight and purely
quantitative difference exists between this pressure and that exerted upon a witness promised
immunity for testifying fully and fairly.").
82. See id. ("[T]he accomplice doubtless feels that no immunity will be proffered unless
the prosecuting attorney believes that his testimony will at least tend to incriminate the defen-
dant").
83. See Beeman, supra note 8, at 802 (discussing incentive to please prosecutor in order
to ensure prosecutorial leniency).
84. See Case Note, Conditional Promise, supra note 8, at 140 ("[A]U accomplice evi-
dence is open to suspicion.").
85. See id. (discussing uncertainty of prosecutorial limitations); Silverglate, supra note
7 (stating that federal case law on due process limitations "yields a mixed rather than a clear
picture"); see also Hughes, supra note 8, at 9-12 (indicating that prosecutors may not have
unfettered prosecutorial discretion).
86. See Hughes, supra note 8, at 35 (stating that due process considerations should prevent
prosecutors from bargaining for specific testimony); Beeman, supra note 8, at 826 (concluding
that admission of unreliable accomplice testimony violates due process); Eisenstadt supra note
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teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee a defendant's
right to fair procedures in state and federal courts." Although the Supreme
Court has articulated an array of standards in determining the exact require-
ments of procedural due process, the concept of fundamental fairness has been
a consistent theme." This concept traditionally has operated to exclude
involuntary confessions89 and unreliable identification testimony.' ° Exclu-
sions are necessary when the usual methods of exposing unreliability, cross-
examination, impeachment, and the jury's independent assessment of credibil-
ity cannot sufficiently protect a defendant's interest in being prosecuted upon
reliable evidence. 91
Scholars have contended that these institutional safeguards are insuffi-
cient because they cannot adequately reveal the extent to which the prosecuto-
rial leniency has influenced the testimony.' These scholars typically direct
this argument at contingent plea agreements? A traditional plea agreement
contemplates a reasonably determinate exchange between the parties - le-
niency (fees) for testimony (services) - which, upon careful instruction, ajury
readily can understand.94 A contingent plea agreement, however, involves a
far more subtle exchange of leniency for value because the amount of the
leniency is contingent, in some cases, upon the results of the proceeding in
8, at 781-82 (suggesting that admission of accomplice testimony is antithetical to due process);
Silverglate, supra note 7 (arguing that use of accomplice testimony offered pursuant to plea
agreements is fundamentally unfair and may violate due process).
87. See Beeman, supra note 8, at 803 (stating that due process requires fair procedures).
88. See id. (pointing out that fundamental fairness is constant theme in due process juris-
prudence).
89. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1978) (finding that defendant's
statements were result of "virtually continuous questioning of a seriously and painfully wounded
man on the edge of unconsciousness" and should have been excluded); Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534, 540 (1961) ("Our decisions under th[e] [Fourteenth] Amendment have made
clear that convictions following the admission into evidence of confessions that are involun-
tary... cannot stand.").
90. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (stating that, under due process,
reliability is "linchpin" in determining admissibility of identification testimony).
91. See Beeman, supra note 8, at 803-04 (stressing importance of exclusions when
customary methods of exposing unreliability are inadequate).
92. See id. at 821 ("Neither judge nor jury can assess accurately the subjective nature of
the impact and ascertain the extent to which the terms of the agreement have altered the content
of the testimony.").
93. See id. (discussing jury's inability to determine witness's motivation under contingent
agreement); Eisenstadt, supra note 8, at 767 (casting doubt on jury's ability to comprehend
subtleties of contingent agreement).
94. See Beeman, supra note 8, at 820 ("Traditional agreements involve straightforward
exchanges which juries can competently evaluate."); Eisenstadt, supra note 8, at 767 (stating
that traditional agreements are subject to jury analysis).
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which the witness provides the testimony. Arguably, this subtlety creates
pressures that are more difficult for a jury to comprehend."
In United States v. Waterman,96 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit considered a due process challenge to a contingent plea
agreement.' In Waterman, the government agreed to recommend a sentence
reduction for an accomplice witness if he gave truthful testimony before the
grand jury and if that testimony led to further indictments.' A panel of the
Eighth Circuit concluded that this agreement amounted to an offer of favor-
able treatment contingent on the success of the prosecution99 and therefore
reversed the conviction.1"c The court suggested that the agreement was an
"invitation to perjury."'01 On rehearing, however, the en banc court divided
equally without any opinion, thereby restoring the conviction."°u
During the brief period in which Waterman stood,"0 3 a federal district
court in Massachusetts became the second federal court to sustain a due
process challenge to a similar contingent plea agreement. 104 In United States
95. See Beeman, supra note 8, at 821 ("Under contingent agreements, the witness aims
not to exculpate himself, but to incriminate the defendant. Jurors likely have more difficulty
quantifying the force of this motivation.").
96. 732 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir. 1984).
97. United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527, 1531-32 (8th Cir.) (concluding that con-
tingent agreementwith government witness violated due process), rev'd en banc, 732 F.2d 1527,
1533 (8th Cir. 1984). In Waterman, the court considered the defendant's due process challenge
to admission of testimony offered pursuant to a cooperation agreement. Id. at 1528. According
to the Waterman court, the substance of the agreement was that the government would file for
a two-year sentence reduction on the witness's behalf if his testimony before the grand jury
resulted in further indictments. Id. at 1530. The government argued that the jury, which
received notice of the contingency agreement, could weigh the credibility of the cooperating
witness. Id. at 1531. The court refused to accept the government's argument for two reasons.
Id. at 1531-32. First, the prosecutor only vaguely disclosed the contingent nature of the agree-
ment to the jury. Id at 1532. Second, the prosecutor cannot, consistent with due process, rely
on the jury to investigate and weigh the additional incentive to lie that arises from the govern-
ment's promise. Id. Consequently, the Waterman court found that the contingent agreement
violated the defendant's due process right to fundamental fairness. Id. at 1533.
98. Id. at 1530. The grand jury indicted the defendant after hearing the accomplice wit-
ness's testimony. Id. The accomplice witness later testified at the defendant's trial. Id.
99. Id. at 1531.
100. Id.at1532.
101. See id. at 1531 ("Such an agreement is nothing more than an invitation to perjury
having no place in our constitutional system ofjustice.").
102. Id. at 1533.
103. The Eighth Circuit decided United States v. Waterman on May 2, 1984. Id. at 1527.
The Eighth Circuit sitting en bane overruled that decision on September 20,1984. Id.
104. See United States v. Dailey, 589 F. Supp. 561, 561 (D. Mass. 1984) (concluding that
witness plea agreements violated defendant's due process rights), rev'd, 759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir.
1985).
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v. Dailey,"'5 the court stated that contingent agreements impose an intolerable
level of subjective pressure upon witnesses, "whose only interest is supposed
to be in telling the truth."' Consequently, the court concluded that the
"potentially coercive"'" 7 plea agreements violated the defendant's due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment and suppressed the testimony of three wit-
nesses.ls
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit shared
the district court's concern in Dailey regarding the coercive potential of the
plea agreements,"° it vacated the district court's ruling." ° The First Circuit
concluded that the agreements were noncontingent because the available leni-
ency was independent of the prosecution's success."' Furthermore, the court
stated that the government had established a legitimate interest in making the
plea bargain contingent." 2 Because authorities suspected the first two wit-
nesses of being major drug importers with many connections, the government
could encourage full cooperation more effectively by using contingent agree-
ments. 1 The Dailey court regarded these circumstances as fairly compelling
reasons for the government to make somewhat open-ended plea agreements,"
4
implying that the government interest in the agreements outweighed the pos-
sible harm of perjured testimony." 5 The court found no due process violation
105. 589 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass. 1984).
106. Dailey, 589 F. Supp. at 564. In Dailey, the court considered defendant's due process
challenge to three agreements in which the government offered leniency in exchange for testi-
mony. Id. According to the Dailey court, the agreements gave the government three distinct
sentence recommendations, each option having a different triggering point Id. at 563-64. First,
the government could recommend 20 years if the witnesses fully cooperated. Id. at 563.
Second, the government could recommend 10 years depending upon the value ofthe witnesses'
cooperation. Id. Finally, if the witness did not fully cooperate, the government could recom-
mend 35 years. Id. at 563-64. The court reasoned that to receive the 10-year sentence, he must
do something more than fully cooperate. Id. at 564. Consequently, the Dailey court concluded
that the agreements violated due process because they required that the witnesses provide value
to the government rather than just the truth. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 564-65.
109. United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192,196 (lst Cir. 1985).
110. Id. at 201. By the time Dailey reached the First Circuit, the Eighth Circuit sitting en
bane had vacated Waterman. United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527, 1533 (8th Cir. 1984).
Nevertheless, the First Circuit considered the Eighth Circuit's Waterman opinion to be inap-
posite. Dailey, 759 F.2d at 196.




115. See Beeman, supra note 8, at 811 (suggesting that court valued government's interest
in contingent agreements above risk of perjured testimony).
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and therefore admitted the testimony." 6
Since Waterman and Dailey, only one federal court has deemed a plea
bargain agreement so conducive to perjury that it tainted the witness's testi-
mony beyond any possibility of redemption."" In United States v. Baresh,"5
a contingent plea agreement provided the witness with a pardon and permis-
sion to keep assets he obtained with his narcotic profits if his testimony led to
the arrest and indictment of two specified defendants." 9 If the testimony did
not lead to arrest and indictment, however, the witness probably would receive
a fifteen-year sentence even if he told the full truth. 2° The district court
concluded that the witness's uncorroborated testimony against a defendant
whom the government originally had doubted that it could indict was so.
unreliable that its admission violated the defendant's due process rights.1
2
1
Two additional federal appellate court decisions have found contingent
plea agreements constitutional.'2 In United States v. Fallon,"ss the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that the government
could condition the charges brought against a co-conspirator upon the level
of his cooperation at the defendant's trial. 24 The agreement at issue stated
116. Dailey, 759 F.2d at 200. The court did note, however, that contingency agreements
should be reserved for exceptional cases "where the value and extent of the accomplice's knowl-
edge is uncertain but very likely to be great." Id. at 201.
117. See United States v. Baresh, 595 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (concluding
that agreement with co-conspirator violated defendant's due process rights).
118. 595 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
119. See Baresh, 595 F. Supp. at 1134 (discussing terms of agreement). In Baresh, the
court considered defendant's due process challenge to a plea agreement in which the govern-
ment offered defendant's co-conspirator significant rewards in exchange for testimony. Id.
According to the Baresh court, the agreement provided that the government would drop a
pending charge in state court, would provide immunity for any subsequently disclosed narcotic
violations, and would not seek forfeiture ofthe witness's assets that were obtained with narcotic
profits. Id. However, these rewards were contingent on whether the witness's testimony
resulted in indictments against two specific individuals. Id. The court reasoned that the gov-
ernment's largess created an invitation to the witness to commit peijury. Id. at 1137. Conse-
quently, the Baresh court held that the admission of testimony offered pursuant to the agreement
violated the defendant's right to due process. Id.
120. Id. at 1135 n.2.
121. Id. at 1136-37.
122. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text (discussing decisions by two courts
of appeals that have found contingent plea agreements constitutional).
123. 776 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1985).
124. See United States v. Fallon, 776 F.2d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that juy's con-
sideration of co-conspirator's testimony, delivered pursuant to contingent plea agreement, did
not deny defendant fair trial). In Fallon, the court considered the defendant's claim that he had
been denied a fair trial because the government's witness testified pursuant to an agreement in
which leniency was contingent upon the value of the witness's cooperation. Id. According to
the Fallon court, the government agreed that if the witness's cooperation was adequate it would
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that the government would recommend that the witness remain free if, in its
sole discretion, the government believed that the witness's level of coopera-
tion was adequate.' In United States v. Spector,'26 the Eighth Circuit upheld
a similar agreement that was contingent upon a witness's cooperation in
solving and prosecuting crimes." Both the Spector court and the Fallon
court noted the factual similarity between Dailey and their cases. 2  Both
courts found Dailey's reasoning persuasive." 9 The courts concluded that
limiting instructions to the jury, witness impeachment, and cross-examination
were procedurally adequate to safeguard against any dangers to the defen-
dant's due process rights. 3
Recent cases confirm this trend."' In United States v. Risken,13 2 the
informant-witness entered into an agreement whereby the government might
give the witness a post-trial payment depending upon whether or not it ob-
tained a conviction.133  The court found no constitutional objection to the
limit the number of charges brought against the witness and upon sentencing would recommend
that he remain free. Id. The court acknowledged that the agreement created the danger of per-
jured testimony. Id. at 734. Even so, the court decided that procedural safeguards, including
cross-examination and jury instruction, were adequate to minimize the danger of perury. Id.
Consequently, the Fallon court concluded that the defendant had no due process grounds for
a mistrial. Id.
125. Id. at 733.
126. 793 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1986).
127. See United States v. Spector, 793 F.2d 932, 936-37 (8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting defen-
dant's due process challenge to testimony of informant who testified pursuant to contingent plea
agreement). In Spector, the court considered defendant's due process challenge to testimony
offered in exchange for prosecutorial leniency and money. Id. According to the Spector court,
the government agreed to immunize the witness and his family. Id. at 934. The government also
agreed to give the witness $1000 if his testimony resulted in a conviction. Id. at 937 n.3. The
court found that this type of contingent agreement was unobjectionable based upon a review of
applicable authorities. Id. at 936. In addition, the court noted that the government had a strong
case without the witness's testimony. Id. Consequently, the Spector court concluded that
admission ofthe testimony did not violate the defendant's due process rights. Id. at 937.
128. See id. at 936-37 (discussing facts of Dailey); Fallon, 776 F.2d at 733 (same).
129. See Spector, 793 F.2d at 936-37 (discussing reasoning of Dailey); Fallon, 776 F.2d
at 733 (same).
130. See Spector, 793 F.2d at 936-37 (pointing out that cross-examination was effective
procedure to elicit contingent nature of witness plea agreement); United States v. Fallon, 776
F.2d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The established safeguards ofthe Anglo-American legal system
leave the veracity of a witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of his
testimony to be determined by a properly instructed jury." (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 311 (1966))). But see Spector, 793 F.2d at 939-40 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (arguing
contingent nature of agreement was 'just too much").
131. See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text (discussing recent cases in which
federal courts rejected constitutional challenges to accomplice cooperation agreements).
132. 788 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1986).
133. See United States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361, 1372-73 (8th Cir. 1986) (discussing
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testimony. 34 In United States v. Wilson, 3' the government promised the
witnesses immunity and informed them that, depending on their testimony at
trial, they might be eligible to receive a substantial monetary reward from the
government, perhaps as much as eleven million dollars, for aiding in the
detection and punishment of tax offenders.3 6 The court decided that the
witnesses' testimony was unobjectionable because the government had fully
disclosed the terms of the agreement and the court had given a cautionary
instruction to the jury.1
3 7
Despite the tendency of federal courts to reject constitutional chal-
lenges, 38 many scholars continue to attack the legality of accomplice plea
implied agreement in which government promised witness $5000 contingent upon successful
prosecution of defendant). In Risken, the court considered whether an implied agreement
between the government and a witness warranted reversal of defendant's conviction. Id. at 1363.
According to the Risken court, the FBI and the witness had an implied understanding that the FBI
might pay the witness in exchange for his testimony. Id. at 1373. Furthermore, the FBI had
indicated to the witness that the FBI amount of his payment might depend on whether the
defendant was convicted. Id. Even so, the Risken court found that the contingent agreement
between the FBI and the witness did not warrant reversal of the conviction. Id. at 1374. In
addition to challenging the deal itself, defendant also challenged the government's nondisclosure
of the contingent agreement. Id. at 1372. Although the court determined that the government
should have disclosed the implied agreement, it found that even had the government disclosed
the agreement no reasonable probability existed that the result of the trial would have been
different Id. at 1374-75. Consequently, the Risken court upheld the defendant's conviction.
Id. at 1375.
134. See id. at 1373 (stating that contingent nature of agreement did not require reversal
of defendant's conviction).
135. 904 F.2d 656 (1 lth Cir. 1990).
136. See United States v. Wilson, 904 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that agree-
ment in which government promised witnesses immunity and indicated they were eligible to
receive substantial monetary reward based upon value of their testimony did not violate defen-
dant's due process rights). In Wilson, the court considered whether the testimony of two wit-
nesses motivated by contingent agreements violated defendant's due process rights. Id. Accord-
ing to the Wilson court, the government promised its key witnesses immunity and informed them
that they could anticipate substantial monetary awards. Id. The government based its promise
upon a statute that allows the Secretary of the Treasury to pay individuals who help detect and
bring to trial persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws. Id. at 658. The court found
that the government had indicated that the two witnesses might expect as much as $11,000,000
depending upon the result of the prosecution and the amount recovered from the defendant Id.
The Wilson court recognized the potential for misuse of the statute as a means of obtaining
favorable testimony. Id. Even so, the court reasoned that the jury was able to determine the
credibility of the informant witnesses. Id. at 660. Consequently, the Wilson court held that the
defendants were not deprived of due process. Id.
137. See id. at 658-59 (stating that disclosure and cautionary instruction allowed jury
accurately to weigh credibility of government witnesses).
138. See supra notes 96-137 and accompanying text (discussing decisions of First, Sev-
enth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit courts rejecting constitutional challenges to accomplice
cooperation agreements). State courts are generally more sensitive than their federal counter-
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agreements on due process grounds. 139 They have argued that due process
requires courts to impose limits upon the level of pressure that prosecutors
may bring to bear on a witness in order to induce favorable testimony.14
These scholars have suggested that the courts' ftilure to impose appropriate
limitations upon prosecutorial practices diminishes the integrity of the fact-
finding process that is at the heart of the Due Process Clause. 4'
B. Supervisory Powers
Some scholars have contended that even if courts do not hold contingent
plea agreements unconstitutional, they should exercise their inherent supervi-
sory powers to exclude testimony obtained pursuant to these agreements.' 42
parts to the inherent constitutional defects in certain accomplice plea agreements. See, e.g.,
People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App. 3d 438,455 (1974) ("[A] defendant is denied a fair trial if the
prosecution's case depends substantially upon accomplice testimony and the accomplice witness
is placed, either by the prosecution or the court, under a strong compulsion to testify in a partic-
ular fashion."); People v. Green, 228 P.2d 867, 871-72 (Cal. Dist Ct App. 1951) (reversing
conviction that rested solely upon testimony of accomplice whose promise of immunity was
conditioned upon conviction of defendant); Franklin v. State, 577 P.2d 860, 862 (Nev. 1978)
("[I]f the circumstances of the plea bargain would reasonably cause the alleged accomplice
to believe he must testify in a particular fashion, then a less explicit arrangement [than that in
Medina] also violates defendant's due process rights.").
139. See Hughes, supra note 8, at35 (stating that due process considerations should prevent
prosecutors from bargaining for specific testimony); Beeman, supra note 8, at 826 (concluding
that admission of unreliable accomplice testimony violates due process); Eisenstadt, supra note
8, at 781-82 (suggesting that accomplice testimony offered pursuant to certain plea agreements
is utterly at odds with due process); Silverglate, supra note 7 (arguing that use of accomplice
testimony offered pursuant to plea agreements is fundamentally unfair and may violate due
process).
140. See Hughes, supra note 8, at 35 (suggesting that courts introduce guiding standards
and supervise prosecutorial use of cooperation agreements); Beeman, supra note 8, at 824 ("Pre-
serving the integrity of the judicial system requires appropriate limitations upon prosecutorial
discretion."); Eisenstadt, supra note 8, at 781 ("The tolerance of the due process clause for
prosecutorial manipulation and abuse in the cooperation agreement process is not without its
necessary limits."); Silverglate, supra note 7 (suggesting that Supreme Court "draw a line
between permissible inducements to a witness and tactics that offend due process"); see also
Perroni & McNutt, supra note 69, at 231 ("Courts could set standards that delineate options for
the prosecution to include in any given agreement.").
141. See Hughes, supra note 8, at 35 ("These practices weaken the concept of the trial as
a truth-finding process ... ."); Beeman, supra note 8, at 814-15 (discussing how contingent plea
agreements pose danger to reliability of fact-finding process); Eisenstadt, supra note 8, at 766
("The preservation of the fair trial process by the exclusion of manifestly unreliable evidence lies
at the heart of the due process clause, which has as its essence the 'integrity of the fact-finding
process,' and the 'truth-seeking function of the trial process.'"); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 64 (1980) ("[T]he absence of proper confrontation at trial 'calls into question the
ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process.'" (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
295 (1973))).
142. See Beeman, supra note 8, at 823 (suggesting that courts should exclude accomplice
TOWARD A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically identified the origin and
nature of the lower federal courts' supervisory powers,143 the Court's deci-
sions suggest that the authority to regulate judicial procedure is an incidental
or ancillary power implied in the Article 111 " grant of judicial power.14
Regardless of the origin of the power, courts of appeals as well as district
courts commonly invoke the supervisory power doctrine for a wide range of
purposes. 46
A court may use its supervisory power whenever the administration of
justice is tainted, and thus it need not wait until a government attorney's con-
duct offends due process to use its power.147 Courts have used their super-
visory power to regulate procedure in the trial courts, to promote the search
for the truth in adversarial proceedings, to impose sanctions in response to
governmental misconduct, and to protect the integrity of the courts. 148 Schol-
ars have argued that exclusion oftestimony offered in exchange for prosecuto-
testimony pursuant to their supervisory powers in order to prevent impairment of defendant's
right to fair trial); Eisenstadt, supra note 8, at 779 (arguing that courts could rely on their super-
visory powers to exclude accomplice witnesses' testimony).
143. The Supreme Court's initial decision explicitly recognizing the lower federal courts'
supervisory authority simply asserted that both the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals
have broad powers of supervision over federal proceedings. See Bartone v. United States, 375
U.S. 52, 54 (1963) (per curiam) ("[T]he situation is different in federal proceedings, over which
both the Courts of Appeals and this Court have broad powers of supervision." (citation omit-
ted)). The Court's more recent decisions refer only generally to the supervisory authority of the
federal courts. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505-07 (1983) (discussing general
principles underlying supervisory authority); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734-36 &
n.7 (1980) (discussing societal interests underlying supervisory authority).
144. Article I provides in relevant part "The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
145. See Eisenstadt, supra note 8, at 779 (stating that Supreme Court's decisions suggest
that supervisory power is ancillary power implied in Article HI). The Supreme Court has
recognized that every constitutional grant of authority implicitly includes at least the incidental
or ancillary authority that is absolutely necessary to permit the exercise of the expressly granted
powers. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204, 225-26 (1821) (recognizing ancillary
powers even though "the genius and spirit of our institutions are hostile to the exercise of
implied powers").
146. See Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1973) (discussing 30
cases in which lower federal courts have exercised supervisory power).
147. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,340 (1943) ("Judicial supervision of the
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of establishing and
maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied
merely by observance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing trial by reason which
are summarized as 'due process of law' ....").
148. See Sara Sun Beale, ReconsideringSupervisoryPower in Criminal Cases: Constitu-
tional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433,
1456-60 (1984) (discussing exercise of supervisory power by lower federal courts).
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 515 (2000)
rial leniency will curtail prosecutors' efforts to solicit favorable testimony and





Several scholars have argued that the practice of offering prosecutorial
leniency in exchange for testimony violates at least the spirit, if not the letter,
of the federal witness bribery statute."' 0 Section 201 of Title 18 of the United
States Code addresses bribery of public officials and witnesses,"'1 and subsec-
tion 201(c)(2) specifically states that it is a felony offense to offer anything
of value to a witness for or because of testimony.'52 The plain language of
§ 201 prohibits the well-established practice of paying prosecution witnesses
for their testimony, either with cash or, more typically, with favorable plea
bargains.'53 Scholars have asserted that excluding government prosecutors
149. See Beeman, supra note 8, at 823-24 ("Excluding testimony made pursuant to a
contingent agreement will improve the accuracy and integrity of the fact-finding process.");
Eisenstadt, supra note 8, at 781 (stating that contingent plea agreements present "a significant
threat to the integrity of the judicial system and must not be countenanced"). One scholar
admitted that little, if any, precedent exists for courts using their supervisory powers to exclude
unreliable evidence. See id. at 780 n.198 ("[N]o cases could be found in which supervisory
power has been invoked specifically to regulate the use of unreliable evidence.").
150. See J. Richard Johnston, Paying the Witness: Why Is It OKfor the Prosecution But
Not the Defense?, CPIM. JUST., Winter 1997, 21, at 21 (arguing that when government either
promises or gives anything of value to prosecution witnesses for their testimony, it violates
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)); Beeman, supra note 8, at 826 (stating that contingent plea agreements
"are, in effect, bribes passing from the government to accomplices in return for specific testi-
mony"). Interestingly, Johnston's article, supra, prompted defense counsel in Singleton I to use
§ 201(cX2) in a motion to suppress accomplice testimony that incriminated his client. See
generally Mark Hansen, Shot Down in Mid-Theory, 85 A.B-A. J.46 (May 1999) (discussing
defense counsel's reliance on logic of Johnston's article).
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994) (prohibiting bribery of public officials and witnesses).
152. Section 201(c)(2) provides in relevant part
(c) Whoever -
(2) directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any person,
for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by
such person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any
court, any committee of either House or both Houses of Congress, or any agency,
commission, or officer authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evidence
or take testimony, or for or because of such person's absence therefrom;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
Id.
153. See Johnston, supra note 150, at 21 ("Despite this provision, the DOJ has a well-
established practice of paying prosecution witnesses for their testimony, either in cash or by
favorable plea bargains, or both."); Beeman, supra note 8, at 826 (stating that contingent plea
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from the application of the bribery statute undermines its statutory purpose,
which is to preserve the truth-seeking function of the judicial system by pro-
hibiting individuals from inducing favorable testimony.'"
In conjunction with this bribery argument, scholars also have argued that
the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct pro-
hibit prosecutors from offering leniency in exchange for testimony. 5 Model
Rule 3.4(b) states that a lawyer shall not offer to a witness an inducement that
the law prohibits."" Prosecutors' promises arguably violate either the federal
witness bribery statute or the common-law rule against the payment of occur-
rence witnesses, and therefore the Model Rules prohibit those promises.157
In Singleton I, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
breathed life into contentions that offering prosecutorial leniency in exchange
for testimony violates the federal bribery statute as well as the rules of profes-
sional conduct. 8 Before Singleton I, both courts and scholars had focused
largely on the potential constitutional infirmities of accomplice cooperation
agreements. 59 Over time, the reluctance of federal courts to sustain due
process challenges clearly indicated that due process challenges to accomplice
testimony were unlikely to be successful."6 The federal courts had, for all
intents and purposes, ended the debate surrounding the government's offer-
ing of leniency in exchange for accomplice testimony."" Thus, Singleton I
agreements "are, in effect, bribes passing from the government to accomplices in return for
specific testimony").
154. See Johnston, supra note 150, at 24 ("[C]ompensating a witness for testifying involves
an identical threat to the integrity of the judicial system -whether the witness testifies for the
prosecution or the defense."); Beeman, supra note 8, at 826 ("Judicial tolerance of these
agreements obstructs legislative intent as codified in 18 U.S.C. § 201(cX2) and inhibits the
search for truth.").
155. See Johnston, supra note 150, at 23-24 (discussing rules of professional conduct); Bee-
man, supra note 8, at 826 (discussing ABA Standards and Code of Professional Responsibility).
156. MODEL RLTE. OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 3.4(b) (1999) ("A lawyer shall
not: ... (b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement
to a witness that is prohibited by law....").
157. See Johnston, supra note 150, at 23 ("The common law rule in most jurisdictions is
that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying and that it is improper to
pay an expert witness a contingent fee.").
158. See United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 987 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("Until
Singleton, no other court in the thirty-six year history of section 201(qX2) had applied its
prohibition to a prosecutorial grant of leniency in exchange for truthful testimony."); Taylor,
supra note 26 (stating that before Singleton, no one had taken bribery argument seriously).
159. See supra Part IlLA (explaining due process scholarship and jurisprudence).
160. See supra notes 96-137 and accompanying text (discussing reluctance of federal courts
to sustain due process challenges to accomplice testimony).
161. See Silverglate, supra note 7 ("[T]he effort by defendants to attack the fundamental
fairness of this tactic appears to have been given up for dead.").
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prompted a line of cases that once again forced federal courts to confront the
issue of accomplice testimony.162
IV The Rise and the Fall of a Legal Theory
A. The Rise: Singleton I
In April 1992, the Wichita Police Department began to suspect that drug
dealers were using a local Western Union office to transfer drug money. 63
Through their investigation, the police uncovered a large drug conspiracy run
by several men who had moved to Wichita from California."6 These men had
recruited local women to wire proceeds from drug sales back to California, to
receive wire transfers on behalf of the conspiracy, and to transport cocaine
from California to Wichita. 6 Authorities identified Sonya Singleton as one
of the women who had both transferred and received money for the conspir-
acy!" Wichita police and federal agents arrested Singleton, along with dozens
of others who allegedly were involved in the conspiracy."
Prosecutors indicted Singleton and others on multiple counts of money
laundering and conspiracy to distribute cocaine16s Before trial, Singleton
moved to suppress the testimony of Napoleon Douglas, a convicted cocaine
dealer and one of Singleton's co-conspirators. 69 The thrust of Singleton's
motion was that the government, by entering into a plea agreement with Doug-
las, had impermissibly promised Douglas something of value - leniency - in
return for his testimony. 7 ° This promise, according to Singleton, violated the
federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), and Kansas Rule of Profes-
162. See infra Part IV.C (considering decisions of other federal courts facing challenges
to accomplice testimony after Singleton 1).
163. Singleton I, 144 F.3d 1343, 1343 (10th Cir.), vacated and reh'g granted, 144 F.3d
1343,1361 (10th Cir. 1998), reh'g en banc, 165 F3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1343-44.
166. Id. Singleton's name appeared as either the sender or the recipient on eight wire
transfers allegedly sent on behalf of the conspiracy. Id. at 1344. The government produced
handwriting experts at trial that verified the presence of her handwriting on paperwork that
accompanied the eight wire transfers. Id.
One commentator suggested that "Sonya Singleton's name may soon go down in legal
history, right beside Ernesto Mranda, Dred Scott and Jane Roe as people whose battles in the
courts dramatically changed American society." Mark Curriden, Court to Decide Legality of
Rewarding Informants: Experts Say Thousands of Cases Could Be Jeopardized, DAILAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 17, 1998, atA.
167. See Curriden, supra note 166 (discussing multiple arrests).
168. Singleton I, 144 F.3d at 1344.
169. See Curriden, supra note 166 (discussing Douglas's conviction).
170. Id.
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sional Conduct 3.4(b).171 The district court denied the motion7 2 with an eight-
word ruling: "This statute [18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2)] does not apply to the
government."v
1 7 3
At trial, Douglas testified against Singleton.174 Indeed, he was the only
witness able to identify Singleton as part of the conspiracy. 175 The court sen-
tenced her to almost four years in a federal prison."6 Singleton appealed her
conviction and again asserted that the prosecutorial bargain with Douglas vio-
lated 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(2) and Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(b).
177
A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit unanimously agreed with Singleton.178 Like a stone thrown into a still
pond, the panel's holding in Singleton I created a disturbance that rippled
throughout the federal criminal justice system.'79
The panel highlighted the terms of the written plea agreement, finding
that it included three specific promises that the government made to Douglas
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See William. Glaberson, Leniency Ruling Jolts U.S. Legal Procedures, J. REc. (Okia
City), Nov. 4,1998, atAl (quoting trial judge's ruling).
174. Singleton I, 144 F.3d at 1344.
175. See Curriden, supra note 166 ("During her trial, the only witness able to identify Ms.
Singleton as part of the conspiracy was Napolean Douglas, a convicted cocaine dealer who had
cut a deal with prosecutors.").
176. See Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1343 (noting Singleton's 46-month sentence).
177. Id.
178. See id. at 1358-59 (concluding that government's promise violated 18 U.S.C.
§ 201 (cX2) and Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct 3A(b)).
179. See Marcia Coyle & David E. Rovella, StunningRulings CurtailProsecutors'Power,
NAT'L L.J., July 20, 1998, at Al (stating that Singleton I "dealt a stunning blow to prosecu-
tors"); Richard Grossman, A Blow to Deal-Making Prosecutors, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse,
NY), Aug. 24, 1998, at A6 ("[T]he decision sent the Justice Department into a frenzy in antici-
pation of mass motions by defense lawyers seeking to suppress testimony from any cooperating
witness."); Laurie E. Levenson, Prosecutors Beware, NAT'L L.J., Oct 19, 1998, at B5 ("The
Singleton court sent shock waves through the criminal justice system.. . ."); David E. Rovella
& Gail Diane Cox, Fallout from Singleton Bribe Ruling, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 24, 1998, at Al
(describing fallout from Singleton I as "something between a serious disruption and total
upheaval"); Harvey A. Silverglate, Immunity Is Notfor Sale, Says the 10th Circuit, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 17, 1998, at A19 (describing Singleton Ias "revolutionary" legal development). In addi-
tion to causing a stir in legal newspapers and journals, Singleton I triggered a wide range of
reactions in the popular press. See, e.g., Paul C. Roberts, WASH. TIMEs, July 14, 1998, at A18
("The ruling is important in itself for its defense of innocents against false testimony and for its
expos[6] of the government's practice of obtaining convictions through purchased testimony.");
Editorial, WASH. POST, July 8, 1998, at A16 ("Every now and then, a federal appeals court
issues a ruling that is, at once, so wrongheaded and so sweeping that it results in a brief period
of uncertainty in the legal world before being reversed. The decision... [in Singleton 1] is one
such bombshell.").
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in return for his testimony. °80 First, the government promised not to prosecute
Douglas for any violations of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
stemming from his involvement in the conspiracy other than perjury or related
offenses.' Second, the government promised to file a motion under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e)'82 or under § 5Kl.1 of the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines8 3 if, in its sole discretion, Douglas's cooperation amounted to substantial
assistance.184 Finally, the government promised to inform the Mississippi
parole board about the level of cooperation Douglas provided."85 In consider-
ation for these promises, Douglas agreed to testify truthfully in federal and
state court. 6 Thus, the question before the panel was whether this agreement
violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) or Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct
3.4(b).l s
The first controversial issue that the Singleton I panel decided was
whether § 201(c)(2) applies to an Assistant United States Attorney, acting on
behalf of the government. 88 In Nardone v. United States,89 the Supreme
Court recognized a limited canon of construction which provides that statutes
do not apply to the government or affect governmental rights unless the text
expressly includes the government."9 The Singleton I panel, however, ob-
180. Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1344.
181. Id.
182. The federal criminal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), provides, in relevant
part: "Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence
below a level established by statute as the minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed
an offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994).
183. Section 5KI.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines provides that the gov-
ernment may move for a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines if it determines
that the defendant has "provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense...." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5Kl.1 (1995).
184. Singleton I, 144 F.3d at 1344.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. The agreement at issue in Singleton is typical of those that federal and state
prosecutors enter into daily. See Gerald Walpin, The Tenth Circuit's Singleton Decision Wrong
and Uniformly Rejected, N.Y. L.J., Oct 29,1998, atAl ("The plea agreement that the prosecu-
tor signed with Singleton's co-conspirator was a run-of-the-mill cookie cutter form of coopera-
tion agreement used thousands of times each year for many years ....").
188. Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1344. The word "whoever" qualifies the statutory class under
§ 201(c)(2). See supra note 152 (providing relevant text of § 201(cX2)).
189. 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
190. United States v. Nardone, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937) (discussing canon of statu-
tory construction). In Nardone, the Supreme Court considered whether evidence that a federal
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served that this canon is applicable to only two classes of cases: statutes that
deny the government an established interest and statutes that would result in
an absurdity if applied to the government.191
The class of statutes that would deprive the government of an established
interest includes, for example, a statute of limitation applied to the govern-
ment."9 The panel found that two exceptions removed the federal bribery
statute from that first class of cases. 93 First, the presumption that the statute
excludes the government does not apply if the law merely affects govemmen-
tal agents and not the government itself.1 94 The panel determined that
§ 201(c)(2) only affected governmental agents by limiting the way in which
the agents pursue the government's interest. 9 The panel also found that the
statute fell within a second exception which provides that a statute applies to
the government if the statute's purpose is to prevent fraud, injury, or wrong.
1 96
Thus, because § 201(c)(2) operates to prevent fraud upon the federal courts
in the form of inherently unreliable testimony, the panel concluded that the
proscription of § 201(c)(2) must apply to the government.""
Having exempted the statute from the first class of cases, the panel turned
to the issue of whether the statute fell within the second class of cases to which
the canon applies: statutes that if applied to the government would create an
"obvious absurdity." This class of statutes includes, for example, a speed limit
applied to a policeman in pursuit."s According to the panel, the purchase of
testimony, whether with leniency or with money, taints the judicial process and
officer procured by tapping telephone wires and intercepting messages was admissible in a
federal criminal trial. Id. at 380. The statute provided that "no person" shall intercept a tele-
phone message and divulge its substance. Id. at 382. According to the Nardone Court, the
general words of a statute do not include the government or affect its rights unless such an intent
is clear from the text of the act. Id. at 383. The Nardone Court noted the two categories of cases
in which courts have applied that canon. Id. First, courts apply the canon when a statute would
deprive the sovereign of a recognized or an established prerogative. Id. Second, courts apply
the canon when a reading that includes the government would create an obvious absurdity. Id.
at 384. However, the Court concluded that the canon did not apply in this case to exclude the
government Id. at 383. The Nardone Court also found that another principle required it to
apply the statute to the government, stating that a statute intended to prevent injury and wrong
embraces the government Id. Consequently, the Court concluded that the wire-tapping statute
applied to the government and reversed the defendant's conviction. Id. at 384-85.
191. Singleton 1,144 F.3d at 1345-46.
192. See id. at 1346 (quoting Nardone, 302 U.S. at 383).
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing Nardone, 302 U.S. at 383).
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing United States v. Nardone, 302 U.S. 379,384 (1937)).
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting Nardone, 302 U.S. at 384).
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 515 (2000)
cheapens justice.' The panel then reasoned that because the government has
an obligation to strictly obey the law in the course of a prosecution, it is partic-
ularly appropriate to apply the strictures of § 201(c)(2) to its activities.2"
Therefore, the panel concluded that the statute applied to the government's
officials.
20
The next issue the panel confronted was whether the promises that the
government offered to Douglas fell within the "anything of value" classifica-
tion of the statute.' 2 The panel followed the decisions of other circuits that
have determined that the test of value is whether the recipient subjectively
attaches value to the thing received. °3 The panel noted that not only were the
promises all that Douglas bargained for in return for his testimony and guilty
plea, but Douglas also testified that he wanted the govermnent's assistance to
help "everything work out for [him]."2' 4 Therefore, the panel concluded that
the promises met the test.2"s
199. Id. at 1347.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 1347-48 ("We conclude the statute's application to government officials,
far from being absurd, is at the center of our legal tradition."). The panel noted that if the
statutory term "whoever" did not include an Assistant United States Attorney, the statute would
not prohibit the attorney from bribing a witness with money in exchange for favorable testi-
mony. Id. at 1348. Recognition of this same concept later formed the main gap between the
majority and the concurring opinion in the en bane consideration of this appeal. See infra notes
233-57 and accompanying text (discussing majority and concurring opinions in en bane
decision).
202. Singleton I, 144 F.3d at 1348-49. Section 201(cX2) prohibits offering "anything of
value" to a witness. See supra note 152 (providing relevant text of § 201(cX2)).
203. Singleton 1, 144 F.3d at 1349.
204. M at 1350-51.
205. Id. at 1351. In addition to applying the test of value, the panel identified four further
considerations that supported their conclusion that the promises were within the meaning of
"anything of value." Id. at 1349-50. First, the use in § 201 of"anything of value" indicates an
even broader coverage than that discussed in the precedent that construing the phrase "thing of
value." Id. at 1349. Second, much of the precedent construed statutory language in which the
term appears at the end of a series of enumerated specifics. Id. In contrast, "anything of value"
in § 201(cX2) stands by itself, unlimited by any enumeration. Id. at 1350. Third, the purpose
of the statute - to promote truthfulness by prohibiting efforts to influence testimony - confirms
Congress's broad language. Id. The panel noted that the promise of intangible benefits threatens
truthfulness just as much as a cash payment Id. Finally, § 201(cXl) has an introductory clause
stating "otherwise" than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty. Id. In
contrast, § 201(cX2) does not contain this exemption. Id. In light of these considerations, the
panel found no reason to limit "anything of value" to things reducible to monetary or tangible
value. Id. Indeed, the panel referred to Justice Holmes's admonition that "there is no canon
against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." Id.
(quoting Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337,339 (1929)).
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To answer the government's argument that an overriding policy should
prevent the application of this statute to the government's conduct, the panel
raised sua sponte the law enforcement authority justification.2" The panel
explained that this justification allows a private citizen to violate a criminal
statute to the extent necessary to prevent the commission of a crime if the
violation is reasonable in relation to the harm threatened by the crime." 7 The
panel found that the government's conduct did not fall within this justification
for at least two reasons.' ° First, the prosecutor was not a police officer or one
acting in that capacity.' ° Second, obtaining a conviction was not tantamount
to an exigent need to prevent a crime.
210
Inthe following portion of its opinion, the Singleton Ipanel addressed the
argument that its construction of § 201(c)(2) was inconsistent with other
federal statutes. 2 11 The panel notedthat the federal criminal sentencing statute,
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e),212 § 5Kl.1 ofthe United States Sentencing Guidelines,
213
and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b)214 provide for the possibility that
a defendant's "substantial assistance" in the investigation or the prosecution of
another person will result in a reduced sentence." In order to reconcile these
provisions with § 201 (c)(2), the panel found that "substantial assistance" does
not include testimony.2 6 The panel reasoned that this reading of the statutes
206. Id. at 1352.




210. Id. The court went on to address the Supreme Court's statement that criminal
prohibitions generally are inapplicable to reasonable enforcement actions by officers of the law.
Id. In doing so, the panel found that the above rule embraced only field enforcement activity.
Id. Thus, although courts may evaluate the conduct of police, investigators, and law enforce-
ment agents under a reasonableness standard, courts have not granted prosecutors a justification
to violate generally applicable laws. Id. The court noted that the law enforcement justification
exists to allow field officers a practical means to detect and prevent crime and to apprehend
suspects and is necessary because of the difficulties inherent in detecting certain crimes. Id.
The court declined to expand the meaning of enforcement action beyond this historical scope.
Id. at 1353-54.
211. Id.at 1354.
212. See supra note 182 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994)).
213. Seesupranote 183 (quotingU.S.SENTENCINGGUIDELNESMANUAL§ 5Kl.1 (1995)).
214. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) provides, in relevant part: "The court, on
motion of the Govemment made within one year after the imposition of the sentence, may
reduce a sentence to reflect a defendant's subsequent, substantial assistance in the investigation
or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense...." FED. R. C M P. 35(b).
215. Singleton I,144 F.3d at1354-55.
216. Id. at 1355.
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would not impair the substantial assistance provisions because a defendant can
substantially assist an investigation or prosecution in many ways other than by
testifying.1 7 Furthermore, the panel suggested that the government still may
make deals with accomplices for providing assistance other than testimony,
and it still may put accomplices on the stand.21 The government simply may
not attach any promise, offer, or gift to their testimony." 9
The court then addressed the government's alleged violation of Kansas
Professional Rule 3.4(b).Y0 Rule 3.4(b) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not...
offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law."'" Having already
established that intangible value can be equivalent to financial value and that
a promise of leniency can provide an equal or greater incentive to lie than
payment, the court concluded that the government violated Rule 3.4(b).2 2
Finally, the panel considered the appropriate remedy for the govern-
ment's violation of the federal statute.' Noting that to deter unlawful con-
duct courts have applied the exclusionary rule to constitutional, statutory, and
procedural violations, the panel reasoned that the violation at bar demanded
the exclusion ofthe testimony obtained in violation of § 201(c)(2). 4 Further-
more, the panel found that the benefits of deterrence outweighed the evil of
excluding relevant evidence because excluding the testimony removed the
sole incentive for violating § 201(c)(2).'s Furthermore, the panel reasoned
that the admission of tainted testimony directly impugns judicial integrity;226





219. Id. Because the question was not directly before the panel, it declined to decide
whether §5Kl.l(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines exceeds statutory authority
or conflicts with § 201(cX2) by making testimony, as opposed to other forms of cooperation,
a basis for a finding of substantial assistance. Id.
220. Id. at 1358-59.
221. Id. at 1359 (quotingKANSASRULES OFPROFESsiONALCONDUCTRule3.4(b) (1997)).
Section 3.4(b) of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not- ... (b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify
falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law. . . ." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b) (1999).
222. Singleton I, 144 F.3d at 1359.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1359-60.
226. See id. (noting that courts become "party to lawlessness" when they allow "unhindered
use of the fruits of illegality").
227. Id. (quoting Ellins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,222 (1960)).
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Notwithstanding the exclusion of Douglas's testimony, the panel con-
cluded that a rational jury could have found Singleton guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt of both the conspiracy and the money laundering charges."
Therefore, the panel reversed and remanded for a new trial.' On July 10,
1998, a mere nine days following the panel's opinion, the Tenth Circuit acted
on its own motion?' ° and ordered the court to rehear Singleton's appeal en
banc. " Pending the decision of the en banc court, the court vacated the July
1, 1998 opinion of the original panel. 2
B. The Fall: Singleton II
On rehearing, the en bane court decided that the dispute between Single-
ton's position and the government's position revolved around the meaning of
"whoever" in the statute.233 The court reasoned that because Congress did not
add to or redefine the meaning of any word in § 201(c)(2), the court must pre-
sume that Congress intended to employ the common meaning of the word
"whoever.'1234 Relying on Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the
court decided that the word "whoever" connotes a being."5 Thus, because the
United States is an inanimate entity, not a being, construing "whoever" to
include the government would be semantically erroneous."6 Although the
court could have ended the dispute on this note, it went on to discuss how rules
of statutory construction led to the same conclusion.' 3
Like the panel that previously had considered the appeal, the Singleton II
court began with Nardone v. United States. 8 The court found that the case
at bar fell within both categories of cases set forth inNardone."9 First, to sup-
228. Id. at 1361.
229. Id.
230. Id. The Tenth Circuit acted on its own motion pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id at 1361-62. In its July 10 order, the Tenth Circuit ordered the parties to file sup-
plemental briefs. Id. The Tenth Circuit directed the parties to address, in addition to any other
arguments pertinent to the case, whether any opinion reversing the district court would have
prospective or retrospective application. Id. at 1361-62.
233. Singleton I, 165 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc); see supra note 152
(quoting § 201(cX2)).
234. Singleton I, 165 F.3d at 1300.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1300-01.
238. Id.; see supra notes 188-201 (recounting Singleton Is analysis of canon of construc-
tion discussed in Nardone).
239. Singleton 1I, 165 F.3d at 1301.
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port its decision that Singleton's proposed construction was patently absurd,
the court extended the argument to its logical conclusion.24 The court found
that Singleton was implying that Congress intended to subject the United States
to the provisions of § 201(c)(2) and, consequently, like any other violator, to
criminal prosecution. 41 Second, to bolster its decision that Singleton's pro-
posed construction would deprive the government of an established interest,
the court surveyed the history of calling accomplice witnesses to testify under
a plea bargain that promises the witness a reduced sentence. 242 The court found
that this "ingrained practice of granting leniency in exchange for testimony"
has created an established government interest. 3 Moreover, in light of the
longstanding practice, the court presumed that if Congress had intended that
§ 201(c)(2) overturn this aspect of the criminal justice system, it would have
done so in clear, unmistakable language.244
Thus, although the court agreed with the shibboleth that the government
is not above the law, it concluded that this particular statute does not apply to
the government. 245 Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial
of the motion to suppress on § 201(c)(2) grounds.2' However, the court
adopted the ruling of the panel that the evidence in the record was sufficient
to sustain the judgment of conviction, notwithstanding the panel's conclusion
that the district court should have suppressed Douglas's testimony.
247
In his concurring opinion, Judge Lucero stated that he disagreed with the
majority's holding that the word "whoever" in § 201(c)(2) cannot include the
government or its agents.248 He pointed out that the majority's interpretation
would permit the conclusion that a United States Attorney may pay a witness
for false testimony.249 Furthermore, Judge Lucero suggested that the major-
ity's holding was inconsistent with Nardone v. United States. 0 Just as
§ 201(c)(2) used a term that generally applied to a being, the statute under
review in Nardone used "no person" to encompass the class of persons subject
to the law.251 Thus, the majority's conclusion that "whoever" in § 201(c)(2)
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1301-02.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1302.
246. Id.
247. Id..
248. Id. at 1303 (Lucero, J., concurring in judgment).
249. Id. (Lucero, I., concurring injudgment).
250. Id. at 1304 (Lucero, J., concurring in judgment).
251. Id. (Lucero, J., concurring in judgment).
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cannot refer to the government because it connotes a being and not an entity
is inconsistent with the statutory construction used in Nardone."2
Judge Lucero relied on an elementary tenet of statutory construction
which provides that without a "clear intention otherwise, a general statute will
not control or nullify a specific one." 5 After examining the statutory frame-
work authorizing various incentives for cooperating witnesses, Judge Lucero
concluded that, in totality, these statutes construct both a substantive and a
procedural framework for bargaining between government agents and potential
witnesses." The result is a coherent, narrowly-defined body of law that
operates in the same area as the more general prohibitions of § 201(c)(2)."s
Thus, because the specific statute creating incentives conflicts with the general
bribery statute, the latter must give way, at least to the extent it would prohibit
that which the narrow statute would allow." 6 For this reason, Judge Lucero
merely concurred with the majority's result. 7
The three judges who signed the unanimous opinion in Singleton I
dissented in Singleton ff1." Judge Kelly began the opinion by addressing the
critical commentary that arose following the court's prior opinion.29 He com-
pared the grave forecasts made by prosecutors thatthe panel's opinion was the
"death knell for the criminal justice system" to those that prosecutors made
after the Supreme Court's decision inMiranda v. Arizona2 and the advent of
252. Id. (Lucero, J., concurring in judgment).
253. See id. at 1305 (Lucero, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Guidry v. Sheet Metal
Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365,375 (1990)).
254. See id. at 1307 (Lucero, J., concurring in judgment) (discussing statutory schemes
authorizing various incentives for cooperating witnesses).
255. Id. (Lucero, J., concurring in judgment).
256. Id. (Lucero, J., concurring in judgment).
257. Id. (Lucero, J., concurring in judgment).
258. Id. at 1308 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
259. Id. (Kelly, J., dissenting).
260. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Supreme Court considered the admissibility
of statements solicited from a defendant while detained or in custody. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436,445 (1966). According to the Miranda Court, authorities failed to warn each of the
defendants in the consolidated cases of their rights at the outset of the interrogation process.
Id. In all of the cases, authorities secured oral admissions and, in three of them, signed state-
ments. Id. The Miranda Court found that the admission of all these statements at trial violated
the Constitution. Id. at 467. TheMiranda Court determined that the Fifth Amendment protects
persons in all settings from being compelled to incriminate themselves. Id. In order to protect
this privilege, the Court decided that the government must sufficiently inform the accused of
his rights and must fully honor the exercise of those rights. Id. Consequently, the Miranda
Court concluded that "authorities must warn an accused prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
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the exclusionary rule.2" Judge Kelly asserted, however, that no one seriously
could contend that the criminal justice system has become inoperable because
the Court or Congress has effectuated constitutional or statutory guarantees
to ensure a more reliable outcome in criminal proceedings.262
Although Judge Kelly went on to reposit the rationale behind the panel's
first opinion, the most revealing part of his opinion precedes the statutory
analysis.2 6 He noted that the concern for the integrity and fairness of our
criminal justice system that § 201(c) was intended to protect was largely
missing from the debate that had occurred since Singleton .2' Judge Kelly
recognized that the government's obligation to disclose exculpatory informa-
tion and the cross-examination of accomplice witnesses partly ameliorate the
problem, but noted that these devices have limitations.265 He concluded that
in the uncertain world of trial, and in view of § 20 1(c), a witness's demeanor
and testimony are simply too important to hinge upon promises of leniency.2"
By barring an exchange for testimony, he concluded, Congress in § 201(c)
sought to prohibit the most obvious incentive for false testimony.267
C. The Aftermath
Singleton I forced federal courts everywhere to deal with the "Singleton
issue."I2"s An overwhelming majority of the district courts have rejected the
reasoning of-the panel in Singleton .269 Similarly, nine circuits have declined
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." Id. at 479. Unless the government
demonstrates these warnings at trial, the Miranda court stated that prosecutors cannot use any
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation against the accused. Id.
261. Singleton H, 165 F.3d at 1308 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
262. Id. (Kelly, J., dissenting).
263. Id. (Kelly, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 1309 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
265. Id. (Kelly, J., dissenting).
266. Id. (Kelly, J., dissenting).
267. Id. After Singleton H, defense counsel filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S.
Supreme Court. However, the Court denied certiorari. Singleton 1(, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.
1999) (en bane), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999).
268. See United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1120 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[T]his appeal
involves what has come to be known as 'the Singleton issue,' after the now-reversed Tenth Cir-
cuit panel decision in United States v. Singleton."). Singleton I has been cited in nearly two
hundred federal court decisions.
269. See, e.g., United States v. Stillo, No. 97 C 2920,91 CR 795,1999 WL 89660, at *5
(ND. IIl. Feb. 12, 1999) (rejecting reasoning of Singleton 1); United States v. Streater, No.
3:97CR232(EBB), 1999 WL 66534, at *2 (D. Conn. Jan. 19, 1999) (same); United States v.
Percan, No. 98 CR. 392(AGS), 1999 WL 13040, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13,1999) (same); United
States v. Terry, Nos. CIV.A. 98-CV-1566, CR]M. 92-CR-51,1999 WL 20911, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.
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to adopt the Singleton I reasoning."' Although several courts dismissed the
issue without analysis," most courts either agreed with other decisions 2 or
offered their own reasoning."7 Nearly all of the courts offering their own
Jan. 12, 1999) (same); United States v. Johnson, 34 F. Supp. 2d 535, 538 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(same); United States v. Jennings, No. 5-98-CR-418, 1998 WL 865617, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec.
8, 1998) (same); Hall v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 883,895 (E.D. Va. 1998) (same); United
States v. Clark, 29 F. Supp. 2d 569, 569-71 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (same); United States v. Abra-
ham, 29 F. Supp. 2d 206, 207-08 (D.N.J. 1998) (same); United States v. Roque-Acosta, 28 F.
Supp. 2d 1256, 1258 (D. Haw. 1998) (same); United States v. White, 27 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649
(D. Colo. 1998) (same); United States v. Hammer, 25 F. Supp. 2d 518,535-36 (M.D. Pa. 1998)
(same); United States v. Crumpton, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1218-19 (D. Colo. 1998) (same);
United States v. McGuire, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1266 (D. Kan. 1998) (same); United States v.
Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 535-38 (E.D. Va. 1998) (same); United States v. Arana, 18 F. Supp.
2d 715,716-21 (ED. Mich. 1998) (same); United States v. Dunlap, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1183,1184-
88 (D. Colo. 1998) (same); United States v. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp. 2d 521, 521-22 (D. Md.
1998) (same); United States v. Gabourel, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1246-47 (D. Colo. 1998) (same).
270. See United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1999) (decliningto adopt
reasoning of Singleton 1); United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 197-98 (1st Cir. 1999) (same);
United States v. Flores, 172 F-3d 695, 699-700 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v.
Johnson, 169 F.3d 1092,1097 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119,
1122-23 (11th Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Carroll, 166 F.3d 334, 334 n.4 (4th Cir.
1998) (same); United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (same); United
States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359,366-68 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d
414, 418-25 (6th Cir. 1998) (same). Thus, the Singleton I holding has not been the law of any
circuit since the Tenth Circuit vacated the panel's opinion on July 10, 1998.
271. See, e.g., United States v. Bess, No. 98-4112,1999 WL 10024, at *2 (4th Cir. Jan.
12, 1999) (unpublished table opinion) (stating simply "[w]e decline to adopt as the rule in this
circuit the decision in United States v. Singleton"); United States v. Masciandaro, No. 97 CR
305(SHS), 1998 WL 814637, at 1 (S.D. N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998) ("This Court will be as concise
in denying defendant's motion as defendant was in making it this Court declines to adopt the
reasoning of the vacated opinion in Singleton and denies defendant's post-trial motion.");
United States v. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp. 2d 521,521-22 (D. Md. 1998) ("The chances of either
or both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court reaching the same conclusion as the Singleton
panel are, in this Court's judgment, about the same as discovering that the entire roster of the
Baltimore Orioles consists of cleverly disguised leprechauns.").
272. See, e.g.,United Statesv.Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1123(11th Cir. 1999) ("Injoining
the cavalcade - or perhaps we should say stampede - of courts that have considered and rejected
the Singleton panel's holding, we see no point in replowing ground that has been thoroughly
tilled by the other courts whose decisions we have already cited."); United States v. Streater,
No. 3:97CR232(EBB), 1999 WL 66534, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 19, 1999) ("This Court is not
persuaded by the reasoning in the original Singleton decision and joins Judges Nevas and Hall
of this Court in rejecting that reasoning."); United States v. Hammer, 25 F. Supp. 2d 518, 536
(M.D. Pa. 1998) ("We concur with the reasoning and analysis of Judge Rosen [in United States
v. Arana].").
273. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 29 F. Supp. 2d 869, 870-71 (S.D. Ohio 1998)
(offering reasoning for its rejection of Singleton 1); United States v. Abraham, 29 F. Supp. 2d
206,209-14 (D.N.J. 1998) (same).
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reasoning adhered to the rationale relied upon in the majority opinion of
Singleton H 274 concluding that the government was not within the statutory
class of§ 201(c)(2).275 These courts, relying onNardone, declaredthatapplica-
tion of § 201(c)(2) would deprive the government of an established interest and
create an obvious absurdityY6
The logical extension of this argument, however, caused at least one
court to reject this rationale.277 The Northern District of Oklahoma agreed
with the authors of the concurring opinion in Singleton ff2 8 reasoning that
such a reading would exempt from § 201(c)(2) an Assistant United States
Attorney who corruptly pays money to a prosecution witness for fhlse testi-
monyY9 Thus, the Oklahoma court concluded that the government was with-
in the statutory class and § 201(c)(2) technically restricted its activities. °
However, the court recognized that the judiciary must read § 201(c)(2) in
conjunction with subsequent statutes that allow prosecutors to confer benefits
in exchange for testimony."s In short, the court agreed with Judge Lucero's
274. See infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text (discussing cases adhering to reasoning
offered in majority opinion in Singleton 17). But see United States v. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d
1348, 1350-60 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (adopting reasoning of Singleton panel in its entirety), rev'd,
166 F.3d 1119 (1lth Cir. 1999); United States v. Fraguela, No. CRIM. A. 96-0339, 1998 WL
560352, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 1998) (adopting rationale of"original panel decision in Single-
ton as -well as Judge Zloch's district court decision in United States v. Lower/"), vacated, No.
CRIM. A. 96-0339, 1998 WL 910219, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 1998). Judge Zloch issued his
decision in Lowery less than a month after Singleton I and kept legal scholars and commentators
guessing about the longevity of the Singleton I reasoning. See Rovella & Cox, supra note 179
("Even though many thought Singleton would go nowhere, in Florida, U.S. District Judge Wil-
liam 3. Zloch, a Reagan appointee, became the first federal judge to cite the case in nixing three
plea deals with defendants in a drug case.").
275. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (concluding
that § 201(eX2) does not apply to government); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414,419 (6th
Cir. 1998) (same); Clark, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 870 (same).
276. See, e.g., Ramsey, 165 F.3d at 988-90 (concluding that § 201(cX2) would deprive
government of established prerogative and create obvious absurdity); Ware, 161 F.3d at 419
(same); Clark, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 870 (same).
277. See infra notes 279-82 and accompanying text (discussing Revis decision, which
rejects reasoning of majority in Singleton 1l).
278. See supra notes 248-57 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Lucero's concurring
opinion in Singleton 1).
279. See United States v. Revis, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1254 (N.D. Okla. 1998) ("[I]t is oo
plain for argument that if a United States Attorney corruptly pays money to a prosecution witness
for false testimony, such conduct would be covered under the bribery and gratuity provisions in
18 U.S.C. § 201. This result is not absurd; indeed a contrary outcome would be absurd.").
280. See id. at 1257 ("Having concluded that the United States Attorney ... gave leni-
ency.... 'because of testimony' in this ease, the Court finds that such actions come within the
language of § 201(cX2).").
281. See id. ("[U]nder the applicable rules of statutory interpretation, the analysis turns to
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conclusion that the general prohibition of § 201(c)(2) could not nullify the
extensive statutory framework authorizing prosecutorial leniency and other
incentives for cooperating witnesses?
V Accomplice Testimony and Unfair Prejudice
A. Advancing the Issue
Although federal courts resolved the statutory issue framed by Singleton
I, they failed to respond to the underlying issue of whether accomplice testi-
mony offered in exchange for prosecutorial leniency is so unreliable that it
should be inadmissible.2 3 Judge Lucero's opinion in Singleton H' offered
a rationale that is a coherent and appropriate resolution of the statutory
issue."s The federal criminal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), autho-
rizes courts, upon motion ofthe government, to reduce sentences for individu-
als who provide "substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another. ''286 In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) instructs the United States Sen-
tencing Commission to ensure that the guidelines reflect the appropriateness
of imposing a reduced sentence because a defendant's "substantial assistance




These statutes expressly contemplate that a defendant may render sub-
stantial assistance in connection with either the investigation or the prosecu-
tion of another.2ss No legislative history construes the words "investigation"
whether the instant conduct by the United States Attorney was specifically authorized by other
laws such that the general prohibition in § 201(c)(2) must give way.").
282. See id. at 1264 ("When the conduct of the government conforms to the specific law,
as it did in this case, a claim that it violated the general prohibition in § 201(cX2) cannot
be maintained."); supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Lucero's con-
clusion).
283. See Singleton II, 165 F.3d 1297, 1308 (10th Cir. 1999) (Kelly, J., dissenting)
("[L]argely missing from the debate since the panel opinion was issued is any concern for the
other deeply held values that § 201(cX2) was intended to protect .... Those concerns center
on maintaining the integrity, fairness, and credibility of our system of criminal justice.").
284. See supra notes 248-57 and accompanying text (discussing concurring opinion of
Singleton I7).
285. See infra notes 286-97 and accompanying text (discussing appropriateness of this
resolution).
286. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994) (authorizing reductions below statutory minimum
sentence); see also supra note 182 (quoting § 3553(c)).
287. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1994) (requiring consideration of defendant's "substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another").
288. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994) (authorizing reduction of sentences for defendant who
provides "substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another"); 28 U.S.C.
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and "prosecution" as these statutes use them.2s9 However, their plain meaning
suggests that information that a defendant provides with respect to another
person prior to either a grand jury hearing or a trial constitutes assistance in
the "investigation. '2r' Therefore, assistance after a grand jury hearing or in
conjunction with a prosecution of that person must be in the form of testi-
mony. To construe the statutes as rewarding assistance in the prosecution of
another person and at the same time to declare that such assistance does not
include testimony would take the word "prosecution" out of the statute.
291
Thus, the statutes' reference to assistance in the prosecution of another person
must include testimony.292 Section 5KI.1 of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines further supports this interpretation because it specifically directs
a court to consider testimony as part of a defendant's substantial assistance
when determining whether to grant a downward departure 93
In totality, §§ 3553(e) and 994(n) construct a framework for bargaining
between government agents and potential witnesses. 29 4 They describe what
the government may offer an accomplice witness and clarify the roles that the
prosecution and the courts play.9 The result is a coherent, narrowly-defined
body of law that operates in the same area as the more general prohibitions of
§ 994(n) (1994) (mandating that court take into account defendant's "substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of another"); see also FED. R. CILM. P. 35(b) (authorizing post-
sentencing reductions "in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code").
289. See United States v. Revis, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1242,1259 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (finding no
legislative history construing words "investigation" and "prosecution" as 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and
28 U.S.C. § 994 use them).
290. See id. (indicating that defendant's pre-trial assistance is assistance in "investigation").
291. See Singleton I, 165 F.3d 1297, 1306 (10th Cir. 1999) (Lucero, J., concurring in
judgment) ("Although there are some forms of assistance in prosecution that are neither testimo-
nial nor duplicative of investigatory assistance, it stretches credulity to suppose that Congress
intended to exclude cooperative testimony from 'substantial assistance' as used in these stat-
utes.").
292. See id. (Lucero, J., concurring in judgment) ("There can be little doubt that Congress
intended to include the provision of cooperative testimony under the rubric of 'substantial
assistance.'").
293. See U.S. SENTENcING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.I(aX2) (1995) (directing court, in
determining appropriate reduction, to consider "the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability
of any information or testimony provided by the defendant").
294. See Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 1307 (Lucero, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that
statutes "create both a substantive and procedural framework for bargaining between govern-
ment agents and potential witnesses").
295. See id. (Lucero, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that statutes "limit the 'some-
thing of value' that the government may offer, and detail the roles of both the prosecution and
the courts in determining sentences, providing immunity, and granting other forms of assis-
tance").
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§ 201 (c)(2).2 6 Under well-established principles of statutory construction, a
general statute such as § 201(c)(2) must yield to a specific statute to the extent
that they conflict.'
However, even if most accomplice plea agreements fall within the limits
that the "substantial assistance" statutes define, that fact does not bolster the
reliability of evidence offered pursuant to such agreements. The underlying
issue in Singleton I was whether promises of leniency and immunity tend to
produce evidence that is so unreliable that disclosure and cross-examination
cannot ameliorate the problem.' The resolution ofthe statutory construction
issue raised in Singleton I does not speak to this broader issue.
B. Playing by the Rules
The federal courts' response to Singleton I forecloses the possibility of
successful statutory challenges to accomplice testimony.' Similarly, recent
decisions inthe due process line of cases indicate that due process challenges
to accomplice testimony are likely to be unsuccessful.3" Also, the likelihood
296. See id. (Lueero, I., concurring in judgment) (stating that statutes "operate in the same
field as the more general prohibitions of§ 201 (cX2)").
297. See id. at 1305 (Lucero, J., concurring in judgment) ("It is an elementary tenet of
statutory construction that '[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will
not be controlled or nullified by a general one.'" (quoting Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l
Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365,375 (1990) (alteration in original))).
298. See id. at 1309 (Kelly, J., dissenting) ("Testifying witnesses may be cross-examined.
Their credibility may be impeached, and the jury is instructed that it may regard such testimony
with caution. However, all of these devices have limitations.").
299. See supra Part II.C (discussing federal courts' near unanimous rejection of reasoning
in Singleton 1). Although the federal courts have spoken clearly on the applicability of the
federal bribery statute to cooperation agreements, those decisions have not foreclosed the
possibility of challenges based on state ethical rules. See Singleton Il, 165 F.3d 1247, 1302-03
(10th Cir. 1999) (Henry, J., concurring) (noting possibility that Singleton Iissue may arise again
in context of state rules of ethics). Indeed, since Congress passed the Citizen's Protection Act
of 1998, subjecting government attorneys to the ethical rules of the state in which they practice,
a challenge based on state ethical rules has more force. See id. (Henry, J., concurring) (indicating
that Citizen's Protection Act repeals Thornburgh Memorandum, which asserted that federal
prosecutors are not subject to rules of professional conduct in force in states where prosecutors
practice). However, at least one federal court of appeals has concluded that state rules of
professional conduct cannot trump the Federal Rules of Evidence, and therefore the ethical rules
are irrelevant to admissibility decisions. See United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119,1124 (1 lth
Cir. 1999) ("State rules of professional conduct, or state rules on any subject, cannot trump the
Federal Rules ofEvidence."). Cf Erica M. Landsberg, CommentPolicingAttorneys: Exclusion
of Unethically ObtainedEvidence, 53 U. CEL L. REV. 1399,1431 (1986) (suggesting that courts
should exclude evidence obtained through violations of rules of professional responsibility).
300. See supra notes 96-137 and accompanying text (discussing decisions in due process
line of cases).
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of successfully persuading courts to invoke their supervisory powers to
exclude accomplice testimony is remote."° Scant precedent suggests that
courts use their supervisory power to exclude unreliable evidence,3" and the
Supreme Court has relied upon the Federal Rules of Evidence to determine
admissibility.3 However, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide an inde-
pendent basis for challenging accomplice testimony offered in exchange for
prosecutorial leniency."°
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is part of a code intended to
promote truth and fairness in the judicial process."0  Labeled the "most funda-
mental rule of inadmissibility,1 3se Rule 403 presents a balancing test for trial
courts to apply when deciding whether to exclude certain evidence. 0 7 After
determining that evidence is relevant under Rules 401 and 402,308 the trial court
then must exercise its sound discretion in ruling on whether to exclude the
301. See infra note 302 and accompanying text (noting virtual absence of precedent sug-
gesting that courts use their supervisory power to exclude unreliable evidence and such use of
supervisory power is unlikely because of Federal Rules of Evidence).
302. See Eisenstadt supra note 8, at 780 n.198 (stating that "no cases could be found
in which supervisory power has been invoked specifically to regulate the use of unreliable
evidence").
303. See United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119,1124 (11th Cir. 1999) ("When it comes
to the admissibility of evidence in federal court, the federal interest in enforcement of federal
law, including federal evidentiary rules, is paramount").
304. See infra notes 305-33 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 403).
305. See FED. R. EVID. 102 (describing goal of Federal Rules of Evidence as being "to
secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion
of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained
and proceedings justly determined"); see also Jon R. WalzJudicialDiscretion in theAdmission
ofEvidence Under the FederalRules ofEvidence, 79 NW. U.L. REV. 1097,1098 (1985) (noting
"high, if somewhat vague, purpose" drafters of Federal Rules of Evidence intended).
306. See Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1336 (1992) (stating that Rule 403 is "most funda-
mental rule of inadmissibility"); see also Walz, supra note 305, at 1110 (identifying Rule 403
as "one of the most, if not the most important of the Federal Rules of Evidence").
307. See FED. R EvID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.").
308. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"); FED. R. EvID. 402 (stating
that "[a]U relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible").
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evidence under Rule 403.11 The rule requires the court to weigh the probative
value of the evidence against the "danger ofunfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury" and "considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."31 In the process of
conducting the balancing test set forth under Rule 403, the rules grant the trial
court great discretion.
311
In the context of a Rule 403 challenge to accomplice testimony, the court
should focus on the danger of "unfair prejudice" to the criminal defendant.
Of course, courts cannot interpret "unfair prejudice" to refer to all evidence
that harms the defendant's case. 13 Rule 403 requires the balancing of proba-
tive value against prejudice only if the latter is "unfair."31 4 The Advisory
Committee's Note gives only slight assistance in its interpretation: "'Unfair
prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on
an improper basis .... 315 This definition suggests that at least two categories
of evidence warrant a court's attention. First, evidence that seems likely to
encourage a decision on an incorrect basis may create a danger of unfair
prejudice. 16 Second, evidence that the trier of fact is likely to overvalue in
assessing its probative force may create a danger of unfair prejudice. 17
309. See Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV.
220, 231 (1976) (stating that Rule 403 "need only be applied to evidence which is otherwise
admissible rather than to the larger category of all relevant evidence").
310. FED.R EVID.403.
311. See 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PRoCEDuRE: EVIDENCE § 5212, at251 (1978) (noting that even though Rule 403 does not
use word "discretion," it nevertheless almost undoubtedly confers discretionary power on trial
judge); see also Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413, 414-15 (1989) (indicating that drafters intentionally built
flexibility into Federal Rules of Evidence).
312. See FED. R. EvID. 403 ("'Elvidence may be excluded ifits probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. .. ").
313. See David Robinson, Jr., Old Chiet Crowder, and Trials by Stipulation, 6 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 311,325 (1998) (stating that this construction would be inconsistent with
requirement that evidence be relevant).
314. See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ...
315. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note.
316. See Robinson, supra note 313, at 326 (stating that unfair prejudice "may result from
evidence that seems likely to encourage a decision on an incorrect basis").
317. See id. (stating that unfair prejudice "may be created by evidence likely to be overval-
ued by the trier of fact in assessing its probative force"); see also Michelson v. United States,
335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) ("The inquiry is not rejected because [it] is irrelevant on the
contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury .... The overriding policy of excluding
such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallow-
ance tends to prevent... undue prejudice.").
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Accomplice testimony falls within this second category for two reasons,
and it therefore creates a danger of unfair prejudice. First, an accomplice
witness has a significant interest not only in minimizing his role in the criminal
activity, but also in incriminating the defendant."' An offer of prosecutorial
leniency enhances the natural tendency of an accomplice to lie by providing an
incentive to offer testimony that is favorable to the prosecution. 19 Under the
substantial assistance provisions, the prosecutor has unilateral discretion to
make or to refuse to make a motion for a downward departure after the accom-
plice witness has testified.320 Thus, the witness must satisfy the prosecutor in
order to obtain the benefit of his bargain. Moreover, this tendency to please
increases proportionally with the value of the benefit offered to the accomplice
witness: The more valuable the benefit offered to the accomplice witness, the
greater the danger thatthe witness will commit perjury. The greater the danger
that the witness will commit perjury, the greater the danger of unfair prejudice
to the defendant.
Second, accomplice witnesses insulate themselves from jury evaluation
because they claim to have participated in the intricacies of the crime
alleged.321 An accomplice witness holds himself out as the witness most
capable of relating the details ofthe criminal activity to the jury because of his
firsthand knowledge of the illegal act." This claim of inside knowledge,
coupled with the fact that his testimony is usually the most damaging evidence
against the defendant, allows the accomplice to deviate from the truth without
arousing the jury's suspicion.3" Because the accomplice alone knows about
the pattern of criminal events, he can manipulate the details of those events
without risking blatant discrepancies.324 In effect, little room remains to ques-
318. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,22-23 (1967) ("To think that criminals will
lie to save their fellows but not to obtain favors from the prosecution for themselves is indeed
to clothe the criminal class with more nobility than one might expect to find in the public at
large."); Saverda, supra note 11, at 786 ("It is in his interest not only to implicate others but to
minimize his own role and exaggerate the roles of his co-conspirators.").
319. See Beeman, supra note 8, at 802 ("Accomplice plea agreements tend to produce
unreliable testimony because they create an incentive for the accomplice to shift blame to the
defendant or other co-conspirators.").
320. See Taylor, supra note 26, at 2 ("Under current practice, a prosecutor can wait until
witnesses have finished testifying and then decide unilaterally whether they have performed well
enough to earn their rewards.").
321. See Saverda, supra note 11, at 786 ("[A]n accomplice claims to have participated in
the intricacies of the crime alleged.").
322. See id. (stating that accomplice witnesses portray themselves as having firsthand
knowledge of illegal act).
323. See id. at 786-87 (suggesting that accomplice witnesses can embellish their narrative
without arousing juries' suspicions).
324. See id. at 787 (stating that accomplice witness can manipulate details without blatant
discrepancies).
TOWARD A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
tion the veracity of his testimony.3' Thus, accomplice testimony "poses a
unique danger": The increased probability that ajury will, unquestioningly and
with little scrutiny, accept a story as true because of its inherent believability. 26
Even so, the danger of unfair prejudice of accomplice testimony must
"substantially outweigh" its probative value under Rule 403, 3 and admittedly,
accomplice testimony is potentially highly probative. Thus, in many instances,
the danger of unfair prejudice will not "substantially outweigh" the probative
value ofthe accomplice witness's testimony. However, the Supreme Court has
stated that the determination of admissibility under Rule 403 requires a com-
plete contextual assessment of all evidence available in a particular case."
Thus, a court mustproperly consider, for example, the absence of evidence that
independently corroborates the challenged accomplice testimony. Although
most states have established corroboration requirements for accomplice
testimony in criminal trials in order to reduce an accomplice's opportunity to
fabricate testimony,329 the federal system has steadfastly refused to impose
such a requirement.33° Consequently, many federal prosecutions often rely
heavily, if not solely, upon uncorroborated accomplice testimony.33x In these
situations, the outcome of the case depends entirely upon the testimony of the
accomplice witness. It is precisely these cases in which the danger of unfair
prejudice will substantially outweigh the admittedly highprobative value ofthe
accomplice testimony and thus warrant exclusion of the testimony.
V. Conclusion
Singleton I was a bold attempt to level the playing field between the
government and the defendant in a criminal case. Regrettably, the response
Singleton I elicited from federal courts was largely devoid of concern for this
laudable goal. Many courts blindly cited tradition as a justification for offer-
325. See id. (suggesting inability to question veracity of accomplice witness).
326. See id. (discussing unique danger accomplice testimony poses).
327. See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("[E]vidence may be excluded ifits probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . ").
328. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182-85 (1997) (adopting contextual
approach for Rule 403 determinations); see also D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Con-
stitutional Challenge to the Treatment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64
WASH. L. REv. 289,318-19 (1989) (supporting drafter's recognition that assessments of unfair
prejudice and probative value should be contextual).
329. See Saverda, supra note 11, at 790-91 (stating that many states have enacted statutes
mandating corroboration of an accomplice's testimony).
330. See id. at 804 (noting lack of federal legislative provisions and judicial standards
addressing corroboration of accomplice testimony).
331. Id. at 795 (discussing federal cases in which uncorroborated accomplice testimony
served as major portion of convicting evidence).
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ing leniency in exchange for testimony. The Supreme Court, however, has
never spoken on the propriety of modem prosecutorial practices, which have
begun to resemble the historically rejected practice of approvement rather than
the model the Court tacitly condoned in the late nineteenth century.332
Until the Supreme Court weighs in decisively on this practice, Rule 403
provides a legitimate basis for challenging the admissibility of accomplice
testimony. At least in cases in which no independent evidence corroborates
the accomplice testimony, defendants should contend that the danger of unfair
prejudice outweighs the probative value of the testimony. If the "quality of
a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the
enforcement of its criminal law, 333 federal courts have a responsibility to
sustain those challenges.
332. See supra Part IIA (discussing historical practice of approvement).
333. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480 (1966) (quoting Walter V. Schaefer,
Federalism and State CriminalProcedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1,26 (1956)).
